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Abstract
In 2008, the Central Bank of Ghana launched the first ever
biometric money, e-zwich, in hopes of promoting branchless
banking and financial inclusion. Despite been hailed as an
innovative policy aimed at transforming the financial
industry of the country e-zwich has yet to realize its full
potential. A number of studies has been conducted to
highlight the many challenges the system faces. This study
was also aimed at seeking an explanation to the relative
ineffectiveness or failures of e-zwich system but through a
theoretical framework. Using Rogers'

(2003) framework on

the characteristics of innovation, the study seeks to
explain why the e-zwich system continues to face
significant challenges despite several attempts that have
been initiated to help revamp it. Rogers argues that the
decision to adopt innovation depends on the innovation's
relative advantages, compatibility, complexity,
trialability and observability and in essence, the success
of the innovation dwells on these characteristics.
Therefore, the study attempts to investigate if e-zwich as
an innovation exhibited these characteristics prior to it
been adopted by the Central Bank.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
With the advent of computers and electronic
communications a large number of alternative electronic
payment systems has emerged. An electronic payment system
is any system used to settle financial transactions through
the transfer of monetary value, and includes the
institutions, instruments, people, rules, procedures,
standards, and technologies that make such an exchange
possible ("Types of E Payment", n.d.). In other words,
electronic payment is a form of financial exchange that
occurs between the buyer and seller facilitated by means of
electronic communication (Kumaga, 2010; See also Vassiliou,
2004) . Payment systems are used instead of tendering cash
in domestic and international transactions and is an
important service provided by banks and other financial
institutions in modern banking. There are not many
inventions that have transformed the business of banking as
quickly as the e-banking revolution (Nitsure, 2003). World
over, banks are reorienting their business strategies
towards new opportunities offered by e-banking.
E-banking, employing either offline or online
technologies, has enabled banks to scale borders, change
strategic behavior and thus bring about new possibilities.
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Even in countries with less developed banking systems, Ebanking has offered many new business opportunities.
Electronic banking has been around for quite some time in
the form of automatic teller machines (ATMs) and telephone
transactions (Nitsure, 2003). In more recent times, it has
been transformed by the internet, enabling both banks and
customers to undertake numerous and varied transactions
within a short period of time. Thus for customers, the
internet offers faster access, is more convenient and
available around the clock regardless of the customer's
location. For banks, it provides a much more efficient and
cost- effective avenue (Nitsure, 2003).
There are varieties of electronic payment. Credit
cards, debit cards and prepaid cards currently represent
the most common form of electronic payments ("Types of EPayment", n.d.). For all three types of cards the consumer
or the business most often uses a plastic card, commonly
with a magnetic stripe. The cardholder gives his or her
card or card number to a merchant who swipes the card
through a terminal or enters the data to a PC. The terminal
transmits data to his or her bank, the appropriator. The
appropriator in turn transmits the data through a card
association to the card issuer who makes a decision on the
transaction and relays it back to the merchant, who gives
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goods or services to the cardholder. Funds flow later for
settlement with credit cards and are debited immediately
for debit or credit cards. Along with magnetic stripe
cards, smart cards are and will increasingly be used for
payments. Smart cards are at present overwhelmingly plastic
credit cards with an embedded computer chip. Hitherto, many
smart cards operated using proprietary rather than common
standards. A standard set of specifications, EuropayMasterCard-Visa (EMV), has been developed and is being used
increasingly so that the chips on smart cards are
interoperable. Korea and Japan are among the most advanced
countries in Asia for smart card payments, with Malaysia
catching up fast due to government mandates for banks to
issue smart cards ("Types of E-Payment", n.d.).
Online payments involve the customer transferring
money or making a purchase online via the internet.
Consumers and businesses can transfer money to third
parties from the bank or other account, and they can also
use credit, debit and prepaid cards to make purchases
online. Current estimates indicate that over 80% of
payments for online purchases are undertaken using a credit
card or debit card ("Types of E-Payment", n.d.). At
present, most online transactions involve payment with a
credit card. While other forms of payment such as direct
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debits to accounts or pre-paid accounts and cards are on
the rise, they currently represent a less developed
transaction methodology.

("Types of E-Payment", n.d.). VISA

is the most popularly used debit card in Ghana although
some of the banks have their own proprietary debit cards
(Kumaga, 2010). Debit cards are used to withdraw cash from
automated teller machine (ATMs) and to make payment of
purchases by using point of sale (POS) outlets. It is
important to note that very few departmental stores and
restaurants have established POS machines to perform
transactions through debit cards.
Another electronic payment that is gradually gaining
grounds is mobile payment. Mobile phones are currently used
for a limited number of electronic transactions. Consumers
can use their mobile phone to pay for transactions in
several ways. Consumers may send an SMS message, transmit a
PIN number, and use Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) to
make online payments, or perform other segments of their
transaction with the phone. As phones develop further,
consumers are likely to be able to use infrared, Bluetooth
and other means more frequently to transmit full account
data in order to make payments securely and easily from
their phone. Additionally, merchants can obtain an
authorization for a credit or debit card transaction by
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attaching a device to their mobile phone. A consortium in
the US also recently announced PowerSwipe, for example,
which physically connects to a Nextel phone, weighs 3.1
ounces, and incorporates a magnetic stripe reader, infrared
printing port, and pass-through connector for charging the
handset battery ("Types of E-Payment", n.d.). In the
developing world, mobile payment is not being lost on them
although mobile transactions are not as sophisticated as
that indicated above and there are certain challenges.
With the rate of mobile phone subscription increasing
by the day, banks in Africa are taking advantage of this
opportunity to encourage mobile banking. Bank customers can
check their account balance, transfer funds to other
accounts among a host of others without having to go to the
banks directly. On a continent where mobile phone use is
popular even among illiterates, it is a good opportunity to
include the uneducated folk into the banking system. As of
2014, it was predicted that internet use on mobile phones
in Africa will increase twenty-fold in the next five years.
(Smith, 2014). This increase, the researchers claim will be
twice the rate of growth in the rest of the world. Thus the
future of electronic payment on the continent is promising.
As Fredrik Jejdling, sub-Saharan Africa head of Swedish
tech company, Ericsson, remarked,

"The large number of
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people in sub-Saharan Africa who do not have bank accounts
suggests that mobile phones may be the only way that many
people will be able to access financial services"

(Smith,

2014). In Ghana for example, almost all the major
telecommunications companies have some sort of mobile money
transactions that customers can subscribe to or it can be
just a one-time transaction. The biggest telecommunication
company in the country, MTN Ghana for instance, has the
Mjara Loans in which subscribers can borrow money and repay
over a certain period, all through the phone.
In Ghana, people are hesitant to receive payment
through electronic medium due to lack of proper education
about e-payment. Similarly in Kenya, Google has teamed up
with Equity Bank, the largest bank in East Africa, to
launch a payment card which lets users pay for their bus
fare via Near Field Communications (NFC) . This payment
system, known as BebaPay (similar to Google Wallet) allows
customers to tap or swipe the prepaid card against a card
reader when boarding a bus to pay for their journey. The
BebaPay service is now available on buses in Nairobi and a
free app enables any Android NFC phone to be used as a card
reader. Shops, traders and small businesses will be able to
use Google's BebaPay in the future to accept payments from
customers, without having expensive tills and cash
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registers."

(Boden, 2013). This system is based on the

Google Wallet concept that allows its users to store debit
cards, credit cards, loyalty cards, and gift cards among
other things, as well as redeeming sales promotions on
their mobile phone. Google Wallet is already being used by
transit commuters in New Jersey to pay for tickets, but its
usage is limited to certain kinds of smartphones.
Thus, albeit cash is yet to disappear from everyday
life, the world's largest information technology and
financial companies are working on ways to completely
replace it with wireless communication payments to be made
from smartphones. And some companies such as IBM want to
take it a step further and link those wireless payments to
biometric signatures to prevent individual accounts from
ever being a victim of identity theft (Gomez, 2015)
Biometric payment is the newest form of electronic
payment system. It is believed that in the near future,
financial services providers might roll out a cashless
system based on the digital wallet concept, or one with an
additional level of security using biometrics that would
extend beyond smartphones (Gomez, 2015). Electronic
payments using biometrics are still largely in their
infancy. Trials are underway in the United States,
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Australia and a limited number of other countries. Most
biometric payments involve using fingerprints as the
identification and access tool. However, companies like
Visa International are piloting more sophisticated
techniques such as voice recognition technology and retina
scans. Essentially, a biometric identifier such as a
fingerprint or voice could replace the plastic card and
more securely identify the person performing the
transaction. The electronic payment is still charged to a
credit card or other account, with the biometric identifier
replacing the card, check or other transaction mechanism.
IBM believes that in the near future, people will be
scanning their eyes to withdraw money from the ATM, for
example, and access accounts. And whether we appreciate the
idea or not, IBM's research suggests that this is a
technological trend that is finally on the move in the
United States. Biometric payment system is gradually
gaining grounds in the developing world as well. South
Africa was the first country in Sub-Saharan Africa to have
employed biometric technology. Due to the increasing access
and use of the internet, people associate e-banking with
only internet banking. It needs to be noted that e-banking
and for that matter biometric technology, can apply to both
offline, online and internet banking. By the end of 2009,
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besides Ghana and Nigeria, the South African firm, Netl
Universal Electronic
Payment System (UEPS) had delivered large biometric
payment systems in Namibia, Botswana, Malawi and Iraq
(Breckenridge, 2005; 2008). The biometric payment systems
in these countries have the advantage of performing both
offline and online transactions. In Ghana and Nigeria
however, biometric technology was first employed to provide
universal identity registration of citizens before later
efforts were made to target people who might use the banks.
In South Africa, the system was used to transfer social
grants. Since the end of the 1990s the founder of Netl
UEPS, Serge Belamant, has been working tirelessly to build
an alternative to the Europay-Mastercard-Visa (EMV)
standard, geared particularly to the needs of the thirdworld poor and using a patented biometric system of
authentication (Breckenridge, 2010). SmartSwitch Nigeria
Limited and Smartswitch Namibia are the Nigerian and
Namibian subsidiaries of Net 1 UEPS Technologies Inc.
respectively. SmartSwitch was established to deploy the
Netl patented Universal Electronic Payment System (UEPS)
technology which provides a secure, universal and
affordable e-purse, multi-application, multi-wallet and
multi-issuer switching and settlement system, catering for
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both the financial and non-financial market sectors.
Similar to the Nigerian system is Ghana's e-zwich biometric
payment system.
Some of the benefits cited by advocates of this system
in both countries were that they are safe and secure,
easily accessible, and extremely affordable. In India, the
state of Andhra Pradesh initiated the oldest biometric
system in the country and like in South Africa, the
project's main aim was to provide electronic benefit
transfers to rural folks. The first Iraqi UEPS transaction
was performed on August 3, 2008, in Baghdad, during the
launch of the UEPS smart card technology with two Iraqi
state banks, Rafidain Bank and Rasheed Bank ("Smart Card
Payment System Launched in Iraq", 2012). Consumers are
issued with biometric UEPS smart cards, so that they can
have welfare payments and other fund transfers loaded onto
their cards. They can then use the cards for purchases at
POS terminals, authenticating themselves either with a PIN
or at a fingerprint reader. A pilot project involving
100,000 beneficiaries was implemented across selected Iraqi
bank branches. The pilot was for the distribution and
payment of government grants to war victims and martyrdom
beneficiaries, as well as salary and wage distribution and
payment to employees of the two state banks.
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So electronic payments are well received by
policymakers in both developed and developing countries,
however in the latter, the initiative is taken up by the
state or local governments or a private-public partnership
while in the developed world, private firms are leading the
way. This reception to electronic payment is necessitated
by the benefits that the system brings to both individuals
and national governments. Promoting a cashless society is
beneficial for so many reasons. The technology being used
to usher in a cashless age has the potential to off er
security benefits to its users. It is very easy to shut
down a digital wallet remotely if it falls into the wrong
hands and biometric ID is specific to only one person, and
therefore very hard to copy. Some major economic benefits
of EPS include mobilizing savings and ensuring most of the
cash available in the country are with the banks (Kumaga,
2010) . This will in turn make funds available to borrowers
(businesses and individuals). A country's payment system
facilitates trade and exchange and these transactions
generate a derived demand for payment instruments
(Humphrey, Kim & Vale, 2001). The cost of making payments
can account for 3 percent of Gross Domestic Product; Since
an electronic payment often only costs from one-third to
one-half as much as a paper-based transaction (a check or
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paper giro) , significant social benefits can be made by
promoting the use of electronic (Humphrey, Kim & Vale,
2001).
Despite the technological advancements in electronic
commerce, electronic payment systems via smart cards,
credit and debit cards have definite disadvantages (Phelan
III. & Phelan, 2007). On a much grander scale, it is
difficult, if not impossible, to predict how a cashless
financial system would work. Consumers may expose
themselves to unnecessary inconvenience and complications,
which are more likely in the early stages of any new
technology. This problem would be particularly profound in
developing countries as witnessed in Ghana, Nigeria, and
India among others. In India for instance, Mukhopadhyay,
Muralidharan, Niehaus & Sukhtankar (2013) noted that:
delays
banks
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However, Gelb and Decker (2007) believe that biometric
technologies have improved and become ubiquitous enough to
allow the confident

identification and low cost needed to
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implement

successful

countries.

cash-transfer programs

Furthermore,

the

greater

sense

in

developing

of

security

associated with electronic payments as against traditional
payment is also doubted by some people. Google, for example
swears

that

the Google Wallet

cash and credit

cards,

but

system is more secure than

just recently it had to do a

temporary shutdown of a feature that allows users to load
prepaid card information onto smartphones for spending. The
reason for the shutdown was due to a security vulnerability
that was exposed by a researcher at a technology convention
(Gomez, 2015).
Another potential problem is the failure rate of
biometric ID systems. These systems may be convenient, but
they are far from perfect. One report states that if you
research "failure rate of biometric data systems" via a
search engine or academic database, you will find some
demoralizing information about the system ("Types of

E-

Payment", n.d.). For instance, a test by the National
Physical Laboratory's Centre for Mathematics and Scientific
Computing in the UK, found that the failure to enroll rate
of the fingerprint biometric system is 1%. This means some
people might not even be able to enroll in a biometric
system using their fingerprints. Hence, the greater the
population, the higher the failure rate. So even though 1%
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may seem like a small figure,

it can actually be

significant. If there are hundred million individuals
wanting to use a biometric system to safeguard their
digital wallets, a failure to enroll rate of 1%, means one
million people would not be able to even use the system. In
Ghana for example, so many individuals complained that they
were not able to perform their transactions because the POS
terminals were not able to recognize their fingerprints.
Issues such as this cast a doubt on whether biometrics are
as reliable as their sales and marketing pitches,
policymakers and advocates portray them to be.
Practically speaking, debit transaction (which is a
feature of biometric payment system) is currently available
in the physical world only, not the internet. A number of
financial institutions have introduced technology that
could advance the development of PIN-based debit processing
on the web, including digital certificates, smartcard
solutions and compact disc-based systems. But no widelyaccepted operating standards have yet to be established
("Online vs. Offline Debit Transactions", 2002).
Nevertheless, it is only a matter of time that biometric
payment systems as found in these developing countries and
elsewhere would incorporate suitable internet technology,
taking e-banking to another level.
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However, on the basis of United Nations report on ebanking in developed countries, United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 2002 report has
identified four challenges that developing countries, in
general, are expected to overcome to achieve the benefits
that e-banking initiatives can bring about (Nitsure, 2003).
First, the ability to adopt global technology to local
requirements. As the report goes on to say, there has to be
an adequate level of infrastructure and human capacity
building before developing countries can adopt the global
technology for their local requirement. A lot of corporate
companies and consumers in some developing countries either
do not trust or do not have access to the necessary
infrastructure to be able to process e-payment. Second, the
capability to strengthen public support for e-finance.
Historically, most e-finance initiatives in developing
countries have been the result of cooperative partnership
between the private and public sectors. As a result, if the
public sector does not have the required capacity to
initiate and implement the projects, it is important that
cooperative efforts between public and private sectors,
along with the multilateral agencies like the World Bank,
be developed to facilitate public support for e-finance
related initiatives.
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Third, the ability to create a necessary level of
regulatory and institutional frameworks: The lack of
regulatory frameworks, trust, security and privacy
standards, high trade barriers, customer and investor
protections impede progress in implementing e-banking
initiatives on a larger scale in many developing countries.
Last but not least, the ability to mainstream small and
medium scale enterprises (SMEs) towards e-banking: The
availability of and access to quality data and banking
information is required for SMEs in developing countries to
move towards e-banking. Similarly, on-line credit
information will enhance SME's ability to secure financing.
Aside these challenges, policies initiated in developing
countries are often polarized among political lines as the
incumbent governments always try to tie the success of any
policy to its managerial prowess. As a result, any failure,
is quickly attributed to incompetence on the part of the
sitting government and its national party by opposition
parties. Opposition parties are therefore quick to oppose
any initiative implemented by the incumbent government
regardless of the benefits of the policy. Even more
problematic is the possibility of a new regime abandoning
sound projects initiated by the previous regime. This
problem obviously affects the sustainability and support of
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any prior policies initiated by the previous. So many
projects are many a time, inadequately funded rendering
them ineffective.
The UNCTAD 2002 report could not have been any more
accurate. These are real challenges that confront most
developing countries in their effort to catch up to the
rest of the world with regard to e-banking. As a result,
biometric payment systems delivered in the above mentioned
countries have faced similar challenges identified in the
report. In India (where the poverty ratio is still adverse
at 26.1 per cent of total population), it is likely that
wealthier people will rapidly migrate to e-banking
platforms leaving the poor to bear the cost of the physical
infrastructure of branches in the form of transaction fees
or non-competitive interest rates on their deposits
(Nitsure, 2003). Likewise in Ghana, systems of biometric
identification that was initially meant to provide
universal identity registration was obscured by the effort
to target people who might use the banks (Breckenridge,
2010).
The value of this research therefore is to investigate
certain characteristics that favor the adoption of global
or foreign policies by local economies. It attempts to do
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so by emphasizing Ghana's biometric payment system, the ezwich and seeks to understand the various reasons that
could explain the relative failure or ineffectiveness of
the policy. Rogers (2003) argues that innovations offering
more relative advantage, compatibility, simplicity,
trialability, and observability will be adopted faster than
other innovations. Using Rogers' framework,

thi~

study

seeks to investigate if the e-zwich policy exhibited these
features prior to it been adopted by the Central Bank of
Ghana.

Fig 1. The E-zwich card.
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW ON APPROACHES TO STUDYING
POLICY

Rogers' diffusion of innovation theory set the
pace for increased scholarly work on policy diffusion.
While his emphasis was on the role of 'people' in the
adoption of an innovation, recent work has focused on the
various processes involved in policy diffusion. This
section of the study, aside looking at the various
diffusion mechanisms existing in the literature, also
discusses other equally important approaches to studying
policy adoption or diffusion. Rogers' theory of innovation
is also examined without going into its nitty-gritties and
an attempt is made to justify why this particular theory
was deployed at the expense of other approaches to studying
policy adoption and particularly, for the case studies
presented here. For brevity purposes the study only looks
at a handful of alternative theories on how policies are
adopted and implemented by policymakers in a social system.
They are pluralism, regime theory, and institutionalism.
These theories are examined because they have attracted
substantial scholarly work, with authors positing variants
of each theory while attracting equally significant
criticisms. The study does not thoroughly address every
facet of each theory, only looking at its main argument and
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its fit with the whole purpose of the study (at the latter
part of this section) . It is equally important to emphasize
that these theories are essentially models of politics but
some of them "help in thinking about public policy"

(Dye,

1992) .

Pluralism
While there are variants of this theory such as
classical pluralism, elite pluralism and neo-pluralism, the
central theme is that politics and decision making are
resided largely in the framework of government, however,
there are many non-governmental groups that use their
resources to exert influence. Nevertheless, as Robert Dahl
explains, the central government is "the most effective
institution for coercion" and the principal allocator of
state resources (Stone, 1993). In its application to public
policymaking, it reasons that power is relatively broadly
(though unequally) distributed among many more or less
organized interest groups in society that compete with each
other to control public policy, with some groups tending to
exert control in one or two issue areas while other groups
and interests tend to dominate in other issue areas or
arenas of struggle ("A Glossary of Political Economy
Terms", n.d.).
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Regime Theory
Regime theory's (especially, urban regime
theory) emphasis on the role of the economy and the private
sector in influencing political choices seems to remedy the
insufficiency of the pluralist thought. The theory's main
argument is that international institutions or regimes
affect the behavior of states or other international
actors. However, by lending itself to international
dynamics, regime theory falls short of the strength of
pluralism: the important role of domestic actors in
policymaking. Stephen Krasner defines regimes as a set of
explicit or implicit "principles, norms, rules, and
decision making procedures around which actor expectations
converge in a given issue-area" Krasner,

(1982). This

definition means that regimes need not be states (James,
2007). If this is the case,

(of course, in many instances,

they are treated as states), it is expected that any
individual including private individuals can carry new
innovations from international institutions or arenas into
their countries especially when such innovations are
perceived to maximize their profits. While this is
possible, businesses are supposed to seek regulatory
permissions from political authorities through executive
agencies before they can implement such innovations in the
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country which can be far from easy. Nevertheless, liberal
regime theorists believe that international institutions at
most bring about an environment conducive to the
convergence of state interests, which facilitates regime
cooperation; and at least, facilitate cooperation that
might otherwise not have been able to occur in an anarchic
world.
Institutionalism
The contention of which interests to serve;
those of the state or private interests as highlighted
above causes rational choice institutionalists to argue
that the choice of either depends on the 'rules of the
game'. That is, the theory posits that institutional rules
alter the behavior of intendedly rational individuals
motivated by material self-interest (Sabatier, & Weible,
2014). And so Peters (2011) argues that individuals, in an
attempt to meet organizational goals, consciously choose to
be, to some extent, constrained by being members of the
institution whether they were compelled to be members or
not. Rational choice institutionalism (RCI)

is however only

one variant of 'new institutionalism' which generally
recognizes that institutions operate in an environment
consisting of other institutions, called the institutional
environment. Every institution is thus influenced by the
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broader environment (or institutional peer pressure) . In
this environment, the main objective of organizations is to
survive. In order to do so, they need to do more than
succeed economically, they need to establish legitimacy
within the world of institutions. Peters (2011) mentions
eight approaches of new institutionalism including RCI
highlighted above. Historical institutionalism provides an
interesting approach to new institutionalism. Not only does
it espouse the importance of history but also how
historical antecedents in political processes persist to
provide the basis for present and future political actions.
And so the adoption of e-payment systems by a political
system depends on 'path-dependent' choices that were made
in the past, hence, the survival of this new technology
would rest on its adaptation or suitability with past
decision structures.
The weakness of historical institutionalism as
an approach of new institutionalism is made up by normative
institutionalism which is guided by the 'logic of
appropriateness' and contends that much of the behavior of
institutional actors is based on the recognized situation
the actors face, the identity of the actors in the
situation, and the analysis by the actor of the rules that
generally govern behavior for that actor in that particular
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situation. That is, political outcomes or actions are no
longer 'locked in' the system, but that the logic of
appropriateness means that actions are "matched to
situations by means of rules organized into identities"
(March, 1994).
If normative institutionalism portends chaos in
organizations, discursive institutionalism is a greater
culprit of this problem. By arguing that 'ideas' shape
individuals' behavior which in turn shapes institutions,
discursive institutionalism challenges the inherent stasis
with other institutionalisms. Therefore, in The Oxford
handbook of Political Institutions, Colins Hay states that
this approach attempts to "capture, describe and
interrogate institutional disequilibrium". This is perhaps
born out of the fact that members of an institution do not
accept ideas blindly (Peters, 2011). To reduce this
problem, Peters (20110 emphasizes the importance of
coordinative efforts of members of the institution to
create, elaborate and justify the ideas in setting policy
agenda. Thus, communication is the key to consensus.
However, Peters rightly contends that not all members are
equal in policy negotiations, some members have access to
the policy arena while others do not. Sociological
institutionalism is perhaps the approach that truly
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embodies the environmental aspect of new institutionalism
even though others argue that it shares similarities with
normative institutionalism. This approach argues that
institutions mimic certain values of its
environment/society for purposes of gaining legitimacy and
not necessarily for 'functional' or organizational goals.
In other words, institutions adopt certain elements of its
environment-cultural or institutional field just because
other institutions have those elements even if they are not
needed in the organization. Thus, perhaps countries in
southern Africa (Malawi, Botswana and Namibia) which
adopted the biometric payment system from neighboring South
Africa did so out of the intention that they are also seen
as 'technological' or 'sophisticated' countries and not
necessarily for perceived advantages that the system could
bring.
New institutionalism undoubtedly provides a
great deal of interest on how institutions, regardless of
the type influence individuals' actions or behavior.
However, it is important to note that institutions are
embedded in the 'state', hence their constraining power
would somehow be influenced by the state. It is logical to
reason that a democratic or capitalist state would
influence institutions differently from how a socialist
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state would impact its institutions. Skopcol (1990) is
therefore justified when she calls for Bringing the State
Back in political analysis. This is where old
institutionalism varies from new institutionalism. For the
former, public policy is authoritatively determined,
implemented, and enforced by governmental institutions
(Dye, 1992). Dye contends that governmental institutions
offer three distinctive characteristics to public policies;
legitimacy, universality and coercion.
Governmental policies are generally seen as
legal obligations that command the loyalty of the public.
While policies of other groups and organizations such as
corporations, churches and a host of others may be seen as
important and binding, only governmental policies involve
legal obligations. Second, only government policies extend
to all people of the society irrespective of social status;
the policies of other groups he states, only reach a part
of the society. Lastly, government monopolizes coercion in
society; that is, only government can legitimately arrest
and imprison those individuals who violate its policies.
Therefore, an e-payment should carry enough legitimacy that
almost all citizens embrace it and deviants are either
coerced into suing the system or risk going to jail.
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MODELS FOR POLICY ANALYSIS

Although regime theory, pluralism, and
institutionalism can be applied to the policymaking
process, other theories; punctuated equilibrium, advanced
coalition theory, public choice theory and policy diffusion
are considered in this study as more suitable.
Punctuated Equilibrium

This theory was originally developed by
Baumgartner and Jones (1993), and argues that policymaking
is characterized by long periods of incremental change
punctuated by brief periods of major policy change
(Sabatier, 2014). As a result, rarely observed substantial
policy alterations may take place when opponents of extant
policy create new perceptions of the issue at stake and
search for support for their new policy idea (Donelly and
Hogan, 2012; see also Meijerink, 2005, p. 1064). Therefore,
Kleistra and Mayer (2001) indicate what they call
"carriers"

(motors for change) and "barriers"

(hindrances

to change) are two sides of the one coin (Donelly and
Hogan, 2012). Specifically, the model states that policy
generally goes through incremental changes due to several
restraints, namely the 'stickiness' of institutional
cultures, vested interests, and the bounded rationality of
individual decision-makers. For policy to change therefore,
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there will have to be changes in these conditions,
especially in party control of government, or changes in
public opinion.
This theory would therefore posit that the
adoption of an e-payment system is functional due to the
need to adapt to changing situations especially if these
new situations are born out of change in government or
regime (for a progressive one) . Such a change however may
not be reflective of public opinion and the innovation may
not be the right fit for the society.
Advocacy Coalition Network
The advocacy coalition network, attributed to
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1988, 1993), deals with the
interaction of advocacy coalitions-each comprising actors
from a variety of institutions with a set of policy beliefs
(Sabatier & Weible, 2014) and form an alliance to mobilize
resources to attain greater influence in the policymaking
process (Nohrstedt & Weible, 2010, p. 16). This approach
seeks to explain how groups,

forming over an issue of

concern to them, can lead to the development of new ideas
for change (Donnelly & Hogan, 2012; Jones & Jenkins-Smith,
2009). On the other hand, Sabatier & Weible,

(2007, p. 202)

contend that for policy change to occur, an external shock
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is required, such as a macroeconomic crisis whereas for the
"epistemic approach", policy change may be precipitated by
uncertainty over a problem (Meijerink, 2005, p. 1063).
Nevertheless, both approaches show the roles of networks,
ideas, information and learning processes in policy change
(Donnelly & Hogan, 2012; Haas, 2004). This means that this
theory has similar weakness as punctuated equilibrium, the
only difference is that there is the emphasis on
collaboration between groups to deal with the change,
exogenous (Sabatier & Weible, 2007) or endogenous (Jones &
Jenkins-Smith, 2009) .
Public Choice Theory
Public choice theory (PCT) challenges the
earlier assertion in political science that individuals act
differently in politics than they do in the marketplace
(Dye, 1992). PCT posits that all political actors including
voters, taxpayers, candidates, legislators, bureaucrats,
technocrats, parties, bureaucracies and governments intend
to maximize their personal benefits in politics just as in
the marketplace (Dye, 1992). Furthermore, government itself
arises from social contract among individuals who consent
for their mutual interest obey laws and support the
government in exchange for protection of their personal
well-being such as liberties and security.
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Therefore public choice theorists would argue
that the biometric payment systems introduced in South
Africa and Ghana was an attempt by the Central Bank or the
government in these countries to meet their ulterior
motive, say awarding of the contract for the system's
implementation to relatives and family members so as to
share in the profits. However, there were virtually no
complaints or allegations of corruption targeted at
authorities during the adoption of the biometric payment
systems in both countries. This was perhaps due to the
joint-partnership venture between the state and the private
entity, Netl UEPS for the implementation of the innovation.
Perhaps, if the whole project was left in the hands of the
central government, things would have been different
Aside the above theories, there are other
theories that could be deployed in explaining the policy
process in countries. Rationalism, incrementalism, elite,
group, and system theories are all useful in understanding
how policies are formulated. However, like the other
theories, there is either the overemphasis on individuals
or the institutional environment, with little combination
of both variables in explaining policy choices. The study
therefore posits that these theories do not adequately
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demonstrate how political systems adopt innovations from
political systems.
Unlike pluralism, this study is concerned with
how political systems in general adopt policies from other
political systems.

Although it can be argued that both

governmental and non-governmental groups have ties with
international arenas, this is not the focus of the
pluralist theory. It places heavy emphasis on domestic
political and public processes with little or no regard to
its external environment in the shaping of public policies.
Even if there is the assumption of the interaction with
international policy actors, as Dahl contends, the central
government being the crucial decision-maker, does not
guarantee that the observability of alternative policy
options elsewhere would necessarily be adopted in the host
country. The decision to adopt this 'foreign' policy would
depend on the peculiar interest of the dominant actors in
the policy negotiations which can go either way.
Furthermore, for both institutionalisms, policy
is an institutional output as posited. However, both
theories do not fully address the role of environmental
support, albeit the former attempts to remedy this problem.
A greater weakness is its silent or no mention of the
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'policy' itself as an important factor of the political
process; the heavy emphasis on the actions of policymakers
in the decision-making process undermines the importance of
the need for the suitability of those actions to the
policy. For example, given that new situations may require
new solutions, historical institutionalism as an approach
does little to address this problem. The requirements of
adopting and implementing e-payment systems may require a
total overhaul of the financial sector that has been in
place for many decades. In this case, the survival of this
new technology would have less to do with political
decisions made by policymakers in the past and more on
relying new techniques that would perhaps require looking
elsewhere for policy solutions. However, some historical
institutionalists, in an attempt to address this problem
rely on punctuated equilibrium theory or 'critical
junctures' in the system's development path (this theory is
addressed later on this section) that redefines the
political process and become the new foundation for future
political actions.
Also, the flexibility in policymaking afforded
by normative institutionalism by virtue of its 'logic of
appropriateness' imply that policymakers in trying to
ensure the success of e-payment system may look for new
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ways that are suited to it, nevertheless, the institutional
bounds are still inherent and may still constrain actors'
actions. Thus, new implementation measures may not be
optimal in dealing with this new situation. Furthermore,
the morality content in normative institutionalism portends
differences in opinions as regards how a particular
situation should be treated. Also,

"it may run counter to

democratic principles by implying the substitution of tacit
understanding for collective deliberation"

(Balsiger,

n.d.). Discursive institutionalism also stresses the
inequality of access to policy negotiations by members of
an organization. This means that the policies adopted by
superior members may not necessarily represent the best
interest of the institution and perhaps that of the society
at large. Therefore, an e-payrnent system adopted by
policymakers may not receive the necessary institutional
support for its survival and success.
Old institutionalism on the other hand
maintains that the coercive nature of government policies
ensures that all residents of a country comply with the
rules of those policies. However, in reality this is not
the case, almost all public policies, despite its legal
force are not accepted by the society. In fact, there are
many instances whereby the policy itself excludes other
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groups in the society. In other instances too, the
organizational and infrastructural base are non-existent to
ensure the full utilization of that particular policy.
Regime theory also undermines the political and
institutional obstacles to the conception of an idea in the
first place. It assumes that there is a thin line between
domestic and international interests which is not true in
many cases. It therefore appears that the adoption of any
foreign innovation would first have to receive the
political support in the adopting country before further
measures can be taken to bring the innovation into full
force. In short, whereas pluralism fosters greater domestic
interaction and reinforcement of domestic interests, regime
theory undermines domestic interplays and rather
relinquishes the fate of the 'state' into the hands of
international institutions. Furthermore, punctuated
equilibrium theory's overemphasis on exogenous factors in
influencing policy outcomes therefore does not address the
functionality or otherwise of the new policy in the
society. Moreover, the theory implies that extant policies
are discarded for new ideas. This is not the case on many
occasions, in that existing policies may coexist with new
inventions and this could threaten the successful
implementation of the new policy. Thus the adoption of
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biometric payment system in Ghana may be less effective due
to the strong attachment of the society to existing norms.
And so Legro (2000) argues that sometimes a society reembraces the old doctrine of doing things if it fails to
agree on a replacement. Therefore, punctuated equilibrium
like the other theories highlighted above, does not address
the suitability of the new policy to the conditions
existing in the social system; it takes 'changes' as
givens.
Scholars of advocacy coalition network, Jones &
Jenkins-Smith (2009) would argue that the biometric
payments systems deployed in Ghana and South Africa must
have been a conscious effort on the part of advocacy
groups, largely from the financial sectors in both
countries to change the financial system. According to
them, this is because groups form over an issue of concern
to them, and this leads to the development of new ideas for
change. This was however not the case in the countries as
the deployment of the technology was an initiative by
either the Central Bank (Ghana) or the State (South
Africa). Also, contrary to Sabatier and Weible, the
adoption of these systems were not as a result of any
crisis in either society. There were challenges with the
existing system, but they were definitely not at a crisis
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level. Besides, the advent of this new technology brought
with it certain challenges which have lived on to date.
Thus the advocacy coalition theory is also inadequate in
capturing the effectiveness or otherwise of the biometric
payment systems in Ghana and South Africa.
Lastly, Public choice theory over exaggerates
the selfish motive of public workers. It assumes that
public officials would always engage in corrupt practices
just to achieve their material goals. But as far this study
is concerned, no corruption allegations were proceeded in
court against authorities of who spearheaded the adoption
of the innovation in both countries. In South Africa, the
technology was actually deployed to reduce corruption and
this is enough justification to show the misapplication of
the public choice theory to the adoption of biometric
payment systems in both Ghana and South Africa.
This study by relying on Rogers' diffusion
framework implies that it sees policy diffusion as the best
theory in explaining the adoption of policy alternatives in
social systems. The theory is particularly useful in this
study because it specifically deals with the adoption of
technological innovations. Biometric payment system as a
technological innovation is therefore best explained by
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this theory. Furthermore, it is the most often cited work
dealing with diffusion. Moreover, as Rogers' points out,
diffusion is not a single, all-encompassing theory (Yates,
2001). As the study explains in the next section, Rogers'
framework incorporates various aspects of the adoption of a
policy including policy actors, the environment or social
structure, the process and the attributes of the innovation
itself. Rogers' diffusion of innovation is therefore
includes several theoretical perspectives that relate to
the overall concept of diffusion; it is a meta-theory.
Therefore before elaborating on Rogers' diffusion of
innovation particularly his characteristics of innovations
theory, it is important to understand the tenets of general
diffusion theory.
Policy Diffusion: A More Useful Approach

Policy innovation here means a process whereby
a government-a national legislature, state agency, or a
city adopts a new policy (Shipan and Volden, 2008; Mintrom
1997a; Walker 1969) . While the basis for such adoption can
come from within the political system such as from interest
groups, policy innovation can also come from outside the
polity, with the spread of innovation from one government
to another, a process known as policy diffusion (Shipan and
Volden, 2008). The latter is the emphasis of this study.
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There are generally four processes of policy diffusion that
are found in the extant literature: learning, economic
competition, imitation, and coercion. Throughout this
discussion, for the purpose of simplicity, mention is made
of the 'country' or 'state' taking action, that is learning
or competing or any of the mechanisms, for example.
However, it is worthy to note that individual decision
makers are the critical actors in these countries, example,
the Governor of Bank of Ghana.
The first mechanism of diffusion that the study
examines is learning. By observing the politics of policy
adoption and the impact of those policies, policymakers can
learn from the experiences of other governments. Thus, for
Berry and Baybeck, the main proponents of policy diffusion
(Sabatier & Weible, 2014)

"when confronted with a problem,

decision makers simplify the task of finding a solution by
choosing an alternative that has proven successful
elsewhere"

(2005, pg 505). This is similar to advocacy

coalition network theorist, Meijerink, 2005 that policy
change may be precipitated by 'uncertainty' over a problem
as stated above. However, the difference here is that
emphasis is on the 'process' rather than a coalition of
actors who may share similar beliefs. With policy diffusion
by learning, policymakers of one country need not interact
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with actors of the other country from where the particular
policy is being adopted. By merely 'observing', the
adopting country can learn the experiences of other
governments. Rather than adopting policies through
coalition networks, it can only take a single
representation at a conference by a policymaker to decide
adopting the lessons of the conference in his or her
country. A case in point is Bolivia's pension privatization
which was based on Chile's pension privatization system
(Starke, 2013).
The Finance Ministry's budget director, Helga Salinas,
attended the annual conference of the business peak association,
Confederaci6n de Empresarios Privados de Bolivia (CEPB). The keynote
speaker was the architect of Chile's reform, Jose Pinera
(interviewwithCuevas2002) . Widely credited with great persuasive
powers, Pinera advertised his innovation with missionary zeal. Salinas
was so captivated that she took Pinera aside and kept talking to him
over lunch. She depicts this encounter as an eye-opening experience, a
crucial turning point in her ongoing efforts to combat pension
problems, and the starting point of the privatization project, which
drew on very extensive advice and consultations with Chilean experts
during the following years (interviews with Salinas 2002 and Bonadona
2002).

Thus while it may seem as an advocacy coalition
network (consultations between Chilean and Bolivia policy
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experts), this was clearly after the main actor, the budget
director had 'learnt' of the policy in the first place. So
once learning has taken place, it is easy for diffusion to
follow. However, learning involves a determination of
whether a policy adopted elsewhere has been largely
successful as was the case in Chile which led Bolivia
adopting the former's pension privatization model.
Similarly, an assessment of the ability to implement an
innovation is also likely to be a component of the learning
process. And so Nicholson-Crotty & Carley (2015) argues
that potential adopters are likely to ask not only,

"Was

the policy effective in other states that adopted it?" but
also,

"Can we make the policy work for us?"
The second mechanism is economic

co~petition,

albeit some scholars raise it in conjunction with learning,
(Shipan, & Volden, 2008). However, Boehmke and Witmer
(2004) by studying state adoption of Indian gaming
'compacts', argue that both mechanisms are important in
explaining initial adoptions, whereas only economic
competition explains subsequent compacts because previous
experience with one's own compacts removes the need to
learn from the experience of others (Shipan, & Volden,
2008). Thus, Ghana may have learned biometric payment
system from South Africa, but subsequent alterations in its
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system may be attempts to make its system the dominant
force or the best in Africa. As Breckenridge (2010)
indicated, Ghana's biometric payment system although it was
installed by a South African firm, had features that were
different from the latter's. However, it can be reasoned
that economic competition as a diffusion mechanism is more
relevant in the private sector than in the public sector or
at least, among unitary states. Berry and Baybeck (2005)
for instance, argue that learning can take place across
states generally, while economic competition is typically
confined to individuals living near state borders (in the
US).

The third mechanism, imitation, is grounded in
the idea that decision makers may choose policies in order
to show that they are behaving in a proper and adequate
manner (Braun, & Gilardi, 2006; Meyer and Rowan, 1977, p.
349). In other words, actors copy the actions of another in
order to look like that other. So under the learning
mechanism, the policy is adopted for functional purposes
and policymakers are more interested in whether the policy
would be effective or not. That is, there is the focus on
the policy itself, whereas with imitation, the focus is on
the other government (Shipan, & Volden, 2008). The danger
with this mechanism is that countries risk adopting the
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same policies of innovative countries without necessarily
thinking about the consequences of such adoptions. Thus in
South Africa, there was no other country to learn
experiences of biometric payment system from so it could
not have imitated this innovation. Diffusion by imitation
is therefore inspired by sociological institutionalism
which also implies that units have to conform to their
normative environment (Gilardi, 2014). However, it is hard
to dispute that Ghana adopted the biometric payment system
with noble intentions-for financial inclusion and to
harmonize transactions in the banking system. This is even
more so in South Africa, which was the first country to
experiment with this innovation where it was deployed to
enhance the distribution of social grants.
Last but not least is diffusion by coercion. In
the international setting, and as pertaining to this study,
countries can coerce one another through trade practices
and economic sanctions. They can attempt to coerce others
directly, or can do so through international institutions
like the United Nations and the International Monetary
Fund, which encourage or pressure governments to take
actions that meet common expectations (Shipan, & Volden,
2008) . Both South Africa and Ghana biometric payment
systems were not adopted as a result of international
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pressure from donor countries or the Bretton Wood
institutions. Where the biometric payment system has
benefited from donor support directly and indirectly, no
foreign country recommended this policy in the first place
and any donation has been appropriated at the discretion of
the Central Bank and Ghana Interbank Payment and Settlement
Systems, the subsidiary of the former that is charged with
the oversight control of the system.
In conclusion, while the study attributes the
adoption of the biometric payment system in Ghana to the
process of diffusion, it does not subscribe to diffusion by
imitation, economic competition and coercion, but
specifically to the process of learning. Four
justifications are given for this conclusion. The first
clear evidence is the fact that South Africa was the first
country to adopt this innovation on the continent of
Africa, consequently, other neighboring countries adopted
it. As a corollary to the above point, no country in West
Africa had this payment system in place which could have
served as a leaning point to Ghana, hence, it goes to say
that the only suitable country to learn from was South
Africa. As the saying goes,

"If you want to learn, learn

from the best". Second, the fact that a South-African firm
that was deployed for the implementation of the e-zwich in
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Ghana attest to the assumption that the biometric payment
ideas was adopted from South Africa.
In showing that "policy effectiveness is
inexorably linked to implementation choices", NicholsonCrotty, & Carley (2015) argue that policymakers work hard
to ensure that policies are administered in a way that
commensurate with their preferences. As a result, they
further contend that they might pref er adoption information
from states with which they share demographic and
ideological characteristics, lawmakers may place greater
weight on effectiveness information from states that share
similar implementation capacities or environments. And so
the founder of Netl UEPS, the developer of the biometric
payment systems in both Ghana and South Africa, as well as
the Governor of the Central Bank of Ghana, asserted that
the innovation is most suited to the African rural setting
due to its offline feature

(Breckenridge, 2010) .

This study therefore assumes that Ghana adopted
the biometric payment technology from South Africa because
it believed that it shared similar characteristics with
South Africa that would make the system effective in Ghana
as much as it was in South Africa. The logic of this
position is that the simple spread of policies from one
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jurisdiction to another could be caused by any number of
factors, but if we see that jurisdictions are copying
successful policies and forgoing those that prove
ineffective, then we can assert with greater confidence
that policy learning is contributing to diffusion
(Nicholson-Crotty, & Carley (2015). However, the perception
of successful policies elsewhere does not guarantee success
in other jurisdictions. This obviously has to do with the
conditions in place in the adopting nation as well as the
innovation itself and the interplay of both factors. As a
result, some indicators need to be available to serve as
guidelines in measuring the effectiveness of an adopted
policy. One way of assessing the effectiveness of an
adopted innovation can be found in Rogers' characteristics
of innovation framework, which he posits in his book,
Diffusion of Innovations. The book is examined (only
briefly) in the following section.
Diffusion of Innovation
Rogers (2003) Diffusion of Innovation is
broader than what is captured here, but his main argument
was on the role of participants in a social system in the
innovation-diffusion process. Rogers argues that diffusion
is the process by which an innovation is communicated
through certain channels over time among the participants
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in a social system. Rogers proposes that four main elements
influence the spread of a new idea: the innovation itself,
communication channels, time, and a social system. However,
his main emphasis was on human capital (adopters). Rogers'
emphasis on this crucial role of individuals in influencing
the rate of adoption of innovation encouraged him to posit
that the key to adoption is that the person must perceive
the idea, behavior, or product as new or innovative and
that it is through this that diffusion would occur
("Diffusion of Innovation Theory", n.d.). As a result, the
characteristics of the target population are the essential
ingredients that will help or hinder adoption of the
innovation, hence determining its success or failure. He
therefore defined five adopter categories of a population
in any given country and argues that when promoting an
innovation, there are different strategies used to appeal
to the different adopter categories. They are Innovators,
Early Adopters, Early Majority, Late Majority and Laggards.
Innovators are people who want to be the first
to try the innovation. They are adventuresome and willing
to experience new ideas. Hence, they should be prepared to
deal with 'unprofitable' and 'unsuccessful' innovations,
and a certain level of uncertainty about the innovation.
These people are very willing to take risks, and are often
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the first to develop new ideas. Very little effort, if
anything, needs to be done to appeal to this population.
Early Adopters are people who represent opinion leaders.
They enjoy leadership roles, and embrace change
opportunities. With regard to the e-zwich system for
example, such an individual would be the governor of the
Central Bank of Ghana, Dr. Paul Acquah whose "progressive"
inclinations largely influenced the adoption of the
biometric system in Ghana. Without his expert approval of
the technology, based on the perceived 'relative
advantages' that the system would bring to the financial
system in Ghana, perhaps the innovation would not have been
adopted in the first place. Thus, such individuals are
already aware of the need to change and so are very
comfortable adopting new ideas. Strategies to appeal to
this population include how-to manuals and information
sheets on implementation. They do not need information to
convince them to change. Early Majority on the other hand
are rarely leaders, but they do adopt new ideas before the
average person (Diffusion of Innovation Theory, n.d.).
However, they typically need to see evidence that the
innovation works before they are willing to adopt it.
Therefore, in appealing to this population, strategies such
as success stories and evidence of the innovation's
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effectiveness can be deployed.

("Diffusion of Innovation

Theory", n.d.). In short, their adoption of an innovation
is a more conscious effort comparative to Innovators and
Early Adopters.
People who are skeptical of change, and will
only adopt an innovation after it has been tried by the
majority form the Late Majority category. Strategies to
influence the attitude of this population include
information on how many other people have tried the
innovation and have adopted it successfully. To reduce the
uncertainty of the innovation, interpersonal networks of
close peers should persuade the late majority to adopt it.
Then,

"the late majority feel that it is safe to adopt"

(Sahin, 2006; Rogers, 2003, p. 284). Lastly, Laggards are
those who are strongly attached to tradition and very
conservative. They are very doubtful of change and are the
most difficult group to bring into the fray. Strategies to
appeal to this population include statistics, fear appeals,
and pressure from people in the other adopter groups.
("Diffusion of Innovation Theory", n.d.).
Despite his five categories of adopters, Rogers
(2003) further divided them into two main groups: earlier
adopters and later adopters. Earlier adopters comprises
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innovators, early adopters, and early majority, while late
majority and laggards are the later adopters. Rogers
identifies the differences between these two groups on the
basis of socioeconomic status, personality variables, and
communication behaviors, which usually are positively
related to innovativeness (Sahin, 2006). For instance,

"the

individuals or other units in a system who most need the
benefits of a new idea (the less educated, less wealthy,
and the like) are generally the last to adopt an
innovation"

(Rogers, 2003, p. 295). For Rogers, there was

no significant difference between the ages of earlier
adopters and later adopters, but this categorization and
its characteristics are beyond this study. Rogers postulate
on this adopter category however portends certain issues.
First, it is not clear whether adopters should
be seen as policymakers or all individuals in a social
system. It appears that he alternates between these two
types of individual. For example, while he describes (to a
greater extent) Early Majority as consisting of individuals
who hold leadership roles, Later Majority and Laggards are
cast as comprising largely pf the hoi polloi of the
society. The problem with this lack of specification is
that, it is rarely disputed that elites, especially ruling
elites are the main initiators of policies. The decision to
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adopt an innovation or not, rests almost entirely with
these individuals even to the extent of ignoring expert
advice on the consequences of such policy. While the masses
can influence policy choice through public outcry and the
like, the decision to consent to it or clamp down on any
agitations is determined by the ruling elite. Second, it is
far from straightforward to clearly delineate the
population of any social system into his five adopter
categories. For instance, do the various categories of
adopters remain the same for any innovation? Do they remain
the same irrespective of the number of years after adoption
of the innovation? So many questions can be posed that
could challenge this theory of adopters, especially with
regard to its generalization to other social systems.
Rogers deals with some these challenges by indicating that
diffusion manifests itself in different ways in various
cultures and fields and is highly consequential to the type
of adopters and 'innovation-decision process' which he
defined as "an information-seeking and informationprocessing activity, where an individual is motivated to
reduce uncertainty about the advantages and disadvantages
of an innovation"

(Sahin, 2006; Rogers, p. 172).

To surmise, Rogers proposes five steps involved
in the innovation-decision process;

(1) knowledge,

(2)
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persuasion,

(3) decision,

(4) implementation, and (5)

confirmation. The innovation-decision process starts with
the knowledge stage. Here, an individual learns about the
existence of innovation and seeks information about the
innovation. "What?" "how?," and "why?" are the critical
questions in the knowledge phase (Sahin, 2006) . At this
phase, the individual tries to find out "what the
innovation is and how and why it works". It is however
worthy to note that while knowledge is important in the
rate of adoption, individual's attitude also shapes the
adoption or rejection of the innovation. With regard to the
persuasion step, the individual forms a negative or
positive attitude toward the innovation, but "the formation
of a favorable or unfavorable attitude toward an innovation
does not always lead directly or indirectly to an adoption
or rejection"

(Rogers, 2003, p. 176). The individual

develops the attitude after he or she knows about the
innovation, so the persuasion stage occurs after the
knowledge stage in the innovation-decision process.
The decision stage in the innovation-decision
process where the individual chooses to adopt or reject the
innovation. Rogers explains that while adoption refers to
the "full use of an innovation as the best course of action
available," rejection means "not to adopt an innovation"
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(Rogers, 2003, p. 177). If an innovation is tried on a
smaller basis prior to full implementation, it is usually
adopted more quickly, due to the fact that most individuals
would first want to try the innovation in their own
situation and then decide whether to adopt it or not
(Sahin, 2006). The implementation stage is where the
innovation is put into practice. Nevertheless, there is
still some level of uncertainty about the innovation with
regard to its outcomes. Thus, the implementer may need
technical assistance from change agents and others to
reduce the degree of uncertainty about the consequences.
Moreover, the innovation-decision process will end, since
"the innovation loses its distinctive quality as the
separate identity of the new idea disappears"

(Rogers,

2003, p. 180).
These questions raised above and others are the
main reasons why this study choose not to focus on Rogers'
framework on innovation adopters, but rather on his
framework on the characteristics of innovation. With the
latter, the emphasis is not on the 'adopter' per se, but on
the inherent attributes of the innovation itself relative
to the conditions in place in the adopting nation. By
focusing on the characteristics of relative advantage,
compatibility, complexity, trialability and observability
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of innovations, the 'adopters' are defined specifically as
policymakers, and not any individual of the social system.
While the success of the innovation may depend on the
ordinary people, this issue is only secondary and only
comes in after the adoption of the innovation by
policymakers in the first place. Furthermore, the issue of
the conditions in the adopting country is paramount; since
diffusion of innovations occurs in the social system, it is
influenced by the social structure of the social system
(Sahin, 2006) .
For Rogers (2003), structure is "the patterned
arrangements of the units in a system"

(p. 24). And so he

concludes further that the nature of the social system
affects individuals' innovativeness, which is the main
criterion for categorizing adopters. So clearly, the crux
of his theory is the interplay of social structure and the
attributes of the innovation itself in the process of
diffusion and it is for this reason that the study relies
solely on this part (characteristics of innovations) of his
theory. In other words, while Rogers places heavy emphasis
on the role of actors in the social system, he clearly
situates their attitudes as a function of their
environment, hence, it makes sense to rather focus the
study on these social conditions and their interaction with
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the characteristics of the innovation itself to draw more
useful conclusions from the theory and its application to
biometric payment systems in the case studies. A caveat
however is that, actors perception of his or her
environment may not be the accurate picture or certain
environmental factors are perceived as relatively more
important than others, thereby, facilitating the adoption
of a particular policy.
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY
This study employs the case study approach. In
doing case study research, the "case" being studied may be
an individual, organization, event, or action, existing in
a specific time and place. It involves the description of a
management situation and is often associated with
descriptive or exploratory research, without being limited
to these areas (Kumaga, 2010). However, while case study
often involves data collection through multiple sources,
such as verbal reports, personal interviews and
observations as primary data sources (Ghauri, 1983; Bonoma,
1985; Yin, 1994 in Kumaga, 2010), this study relies solely
on secondary data in the form of existing literature. In
other words, it is a literature-based research case study.
The study then situates the e-zwich system in Rogers'
framework of diffusion of innovations in an attempt to
explain if the author's characteristics of innovation were
inherent in the adoption of the e-zwich policy. In other
words, did the e-zwich system exhibit the features of
innovation necessary for it to be adopted in Ghana?
The study, in an attempt to better understand
the author's framework and to highlight the positives and
the weaknesses of the e-zwich system, does a comparative
case study of South Africa's biometric payment system first
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implemented in KwaZulu-Natal and later in neighboring
Eastern

Cape Province. It was later developed into a

national payment system for the distribution of social
grants. The KwaZulu payment system is also applied to
Rogers' framework to ascertain which features of the system
satisfied the author's framework thereby making it
relatively successful. In short, the main aim of the study
is to assess the effectiveness of the e-zwich system on one
hand and to examine if Rogers's characteristics held true
in these two countries. If one system was successful, did
it exhibit Rogers's characteristics? If not, what are the
implications for Rogers's framework?
As an alternative research method, the study
could adopt the survey technique. On the one hand,
administering questionnaires to both subscribers and nonsubscribers alike and assessing their views on the benefits
and challenges they face in using the card in general, or
administering questionnaires to only users of the system,
on the other hand. The former is the technique employed by
Agyeiwaah, Anane, Appiah, and Opoku-Ware (2014). The
authors, focusing on three selected branches of Ghana
Commercial Bank, the country's largest commercial bank in
the Kumasi zone, targeted 120 E-Zwich card bearers and 43
non e-zwich card bearers. Similarly, Issahaku (2012), in
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examining the challenges associated with the use of e-zwich
in retail payments, administered semi-structured
questionnaires in Wa municipality (in the northern region
of Ghana) to fifty (50) e-zwich card bearers and thirty
(30) non e-zwich card bearers. Kumaga (2010) on the other
hand employed a mixed approach including deep interviews
with the Ghana Interbank Payment and Settlement Systems
(GhIPSS) and senior officials of some of the major banks in
Ghana and questionnaires distributed to shops and
individuals that use e-zwich and other debit cards such as
VISA and MasterCard.

(Agyeiwaah, Anane, Appiah, and Opoku-

Ware (2014). In the most recent study on the e-zwich
system, Antwi, Hamza, & Bavoh,

(2015) adopts questionnaire

administration to ascertain the common types of e-payment
systems, the level of adoption of e-zwich, and the factors
influencing its effectiveness.
Quansah, Andoh-Baidoo, & Midha,

(2010) adopt a

different technique; they perform Strengths, Weaknesses,
Opportunities, Threats (SWOT) analysis on the
implementation of the e-zwich system and map the findings
from the SWOT analysis to PPT and GTZ management frameworks
models. Similar to this literature-review based case study,
Breckenridge (2010) does a review of secondary data,
looking into official data and records as well as some
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newspaper stories of the implementation of the e-zwich
system, stating some challenges but highlighting the
potential of the system.
So it is evident that the survey method has
been extensively employed to analyze the effectiveness of
the e-zwich system. However, survey methods are more
appropriate in addressing 'how often something has
happened'

(Yin, 2012), but this question, the study does

not address neither is it examining the initiative's (ezwich's) effectiveness in producing a particular outcome
per se, in which case, Yin suggests that experiments and
quasi-experiments would be more appropriate. Rather, the
study is interested in finding out if those 'outcomes' that
were perceived by policy makers to be produced by the
system have already been produced or not. And if it has
not, did the e-zwich system portray Rogers's
characteristics of innovation before it was adopted or not?
Thus, the study looks at post-implementation effects of the
e-zwich system, and seeks to analyze its effectiveness
through the lens of Rogers' characteristics innovation of
characteristics framework.
Therefore, the case study approach was employed
for this study because as Yin (2012) contends, case studies
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are essential when the research addresses either a
descriptive question-"What is happening or has happened?"or an explanatory question-"How or why did something
happen?"

(Yin, 2012). More specifically, what is happening

to the e-zwich system? Furthermore, as indicated earlier,
the study relies heavily on existing literature, mainly,
scholarly work on the implementation of the e-zwich system
including its challenges as well as reviewing newspaper and
website stories that discuss the e-zwich system. The study,
by employing the interview method would have required
certain sensitive questions, especially with regard to the
role of relevant authorities in charge of the e-zwich
system (for example, officials of Ghana Interbank Payment
Settlement Systems; GhIPSS). Some officials may over
exaggerate or under estimate their functions toward
effective functioning of the system. Thus, data collection
for the study is literature-based as valuable research
questions could involve sensitive subjects which would have
been unsuitable for primary data collection ("Guide To
Undergraduate Dissertations in the Social Sciences", n.d.)
Moreover, while a case study of the e-zwich
system within its real-world context, hence favors the
collection of data in natural settings, compared with
relying on "derived" data (Bromley, 1986, p. 23 in Yin
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2012), collecting data through in-depth interviews,
participant observation recordings and field notes, nonparticipant observation, or some combination of these,
would require extensive period of time, a luxury that the
author does not have given other academic commitments for
the semester. Therefore, the literature-based case
methodology for this study was chosen out of convenience to
the author. Furthermore, the study wanted to avoid the
possibility of not receiving responses on time or not all
by respondents. In an effort to obtain information on the
current number of subscribers of the e-zwich system, I
emailed GhIPSS, so many months after the email sent, I am
yet to receive a reply to my email. So initially, the study
had the intention of sending out questionnaires to relevant
officials of the organization as well officials of the Bank
of Ghana, however, this setback affirmed my suspicion of
employing a mixed method approach. Hence, I decided to rely
solely on secondary data.
Justification for the choice of cases;
biometric systems in both Ghana and Nigeria, is
straightforward. The founder of Netl UEPS, a subsidiary of
Nekwan Applied Technology Holdings Limited (Aplitec) that
installed biometric systems in both countries indicated
that the smart card technology was developed with the aim
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of initiating banking and providing banking services to the
rural poor where existing formal institutions could not
reach due to lack of appropriate technology. In other
words, the technology was the key to bridging the gap and
to forming links between the informal and the formal
sectors ('Pension Pay-out Contractors: follow-up briefing",
n.d.). Both countries have a significant proportion of
their population being poor, therefore, the implementation
of the technology would come with some anticipated
benefits. Since South Africa was the first country to have
implemented this biometric payment system on the continent
as well as having a South-African based private firm that
delivered this biometric payment in Ghana, making
comparisons between the features, successes and challenges
between the respective systems in both countries would
provide useful insights and understanding to policy
diffusion and policy making to scholars, politicians and
policy practitioners.

ROGERS' CHARACTERISTICS OF INNOVATION
Rogers (2003) defined the innovation-diffusion
process as "an uncertainty reduction process"

(p. 232), and

he proposes attributes of innovations that help to decrease
uncertainty about the innovation (Sahin, 2006) . Attributes

62

of innovations includes five characteristics of
innovations: relative advantage, compatibility, complexity,
trialability, and observability. Rogers (2003) stated that
how individuals perceive these characteristics influences
the rate of adoption of innovations. Sahin (2006) provides
a comprehensive review of Rogers' five characteristics of
innovation as described below.
RELATIVE ADVANTAGE
Rogers (2003) defined relative advantage as
"the degree to which an innovation is perceived as being
better than the idea it supersedes"

(p. 229). The cost and

social status motivation aspects of innovations are
elements of relative advantage. Thus some policy makers may
be more status-motivated for adopting innovations, while
for others, it may be less significant. Moreover, Rogers
classified innovations into two types: preventive and
incremental (non-preventive) innovations. "A preventive
innovation is a new idea that an individual adopts now in
order to lower the probability of some unwanted future
event"

(Rogers, 2003, p. 233). Preventive innovations

usually have a slow rate of adoption so their relative
advantage is highly uncertain.
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However, he contends that incremental
innovations provide beneficial outcomes in a short period.
And so if any nation reckons that adopting biometric
payment system in the allocation of social welfare benefits
or as a means of financial inclusion has value, it is most
likely to adopt this technology. To increase the rate of
adopting innovations and to make relative advantage more
effective, direct or indirect monetary payment incentives
may be used to support the individuals of a social system
in adopting an innovation. Incentives are part of support
and motivation factors. Another motivation factor in the
diffusion process is the compatibility attribute.
COMPATIBILITY

Rogers (2003) stated that "compatibility is the
degree to which an innovation is perceived as consistent
with the existing values, past experiences, and needs of
potential adopters"

(p. 15). A lack of compatibility in IT

with individual needs may negatively affect the
individual's IT use (McKenzie, 2001; Sherry, 1997; in
Sahin, 2006). Hoerup (2001)

"describes that each innovation

influences teachers' opinions, beliefs, values, and views
about teaching"

(Sahin, 2006) . If an innovation matches

with an individual's needs, then uncertainty will decrease
and the rate of adoption of the innovation will increase.
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And so the name of the innovation is an important part of
compatibility. What the innovation is called should be
meaningful to the potential adopter. The meaning of the
innovation should also be clear. This is also part of the
complexity attribute.
COMPLEXITY
Rogers (2003) defined complexity as "the degree
to which an innovation is perceived as relatively difficult
to understand and use"

(p. 15). Contrary to the other

attributes, complexity is negatively correlated with the
rate of adoption. Too much complexity of an innovation is
an important impediment in its adoption. A technological
innovation might confront faculty members with the
challenge of changing their teaching methodology to
integrate the technological innovation into their
instruction (Parisot, 1995 in Sahin 2006), so it might have
different levels of complexity. If hardware and software
are user-friendly, then they might be adopted successfully
for the delivery of course materials (Martin, 2003 in Sahin
2006) .

Likewise, a biometric technology that frustrates

customers due to technical hitches renders its
accessibility limited even after the adoption of the
technology.
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TRIALABILITY

With regard to trialability, Rogers (2003)
defined it as the "degree to which an innovation may be
experimented with on a limited basis"

(p. 16). Also,

trialability is positively correlated with the rate of
adoption. The more an innovation is tried, the faster its
adoption. One advantage of this is that reinvention may
occur during the trial of the innovation, especially at the
implementation stage. As a result, the innovation may be
changed or modified by the potential adopter. Increased
reinvention may create faster adoption of the innovation.
For the adoption of an innovation, another important factor
is the secondhand or indirect trial, which is especially
helpful for later adopters. However, Rogers indicated that
Earlier Adopters see the trialability attribute of
innovations as more important than Later Adopters. Thus, a
biometric payment system that is piloted before launching
it on a wider scale has greater chance of achieving its
aims for which it was set up. And the more it is tried, the
better those results.
OBSERVABILITY

The last characteristic of innovations that
Rogers highlights is observability. He defined
observability as "the degree to which the results of an
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innovation are visible to others"

(p. 16). Role modeling

(or peer observation) is the key motivational factor in the
adoption and diffusion of technology (Parisot, 1997).
Similar to relative advantage, compatibility, and
trialability, observability also is positively correlated
with the rate of adoption of an innovation.

And so where

the successes of the innovation in one country are obvious
to surrounding nations and to even more distant ones, the
greater the likelihood that those nations would adopt the
particular innovation. It is therefore no wonder that
countries closer to South Africa (Namibia, Botswana and
Malawi), which was the first nation in Sub-Saharan Africa
to have adopted the biometric technology. Not surprisingly,
these biometric payment systems were installed in these
countries by the same firm, Netl UEPS.
MEASUREMENT OF ROGERS' VARIABLES IN GHANA AND SOUTH AFRICA
Measurement here does not imply any statistical
or mathematical definitions of Rogers' variables, but
rather, some suggestions of indicators based on which these
variables can be identified in both countries. By
implication, these characteristics of innovation must have
been existent before the adoption of the biometric payment
technology in both South Africa and Ghana. Thus, once the
technology has been implemented, there must be clear
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evidence to show that indeed, Rogers' characteristics were
perceived to be existing prior to implementation and were
actually existent based on the 'success' of the system.
Rogers' framework implies that where any innovation is
going through critical difficulties it invariably means
that the characteristics of innovation were not present
prior to adoption and implementation and neither has there
been any current attempt to put those prerequisites in
place or the attempts are simply not enough. And so as long
as they are absent, the true potential of the innovation
will not be realized. In short, where the innovation is
struggling in the adopted country, it means that the
characteristics of relative advantage, trialability,
compatibility, complexity, and observability were absent
prior to implementation and still absent.
Therefore, there has to be certain indicators
in the adopted country that show the existence or otherwise
of these characteristics of innovation. In other words,
these characteristics must be evident even after
implementation of the innovation: the following suggests
some indicators that should be observed with Ghana and
South Africa's biometric payment systems to validate or
invalidate Rogers' framework for policy adoption as well as
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assessing the effectiveness or success of both systems in
the respective countries.
Relative Advantage: With regard to relative
advantage, the main question to be asked is,

"would a

biometric payment system provide certain advantages that
existing payment platforms do not provide?" In other words,
the biometric payment system should be perceived to afford
potential security than existing universal payment system
in the country mainly VISA and MasterCard. Also, does it
afford greater affordability and most importantly,
accessibility than existing payment forms? In short, any
perceived advantages that the new biometric payment system
is believed to provide must be existent prior to the
adoption of the technology. Where such relative advantages
are non-existent or existing payment forms perform similar
functions, then it can be concluded that the advent of the
new biometric payment system would not serve any extra
purposes in the economy. And so in effect, it must be shown
that in both Ghana and South Africa, these advantages have
been clearly achieved and visible to all. The system must
have brought with it, increased income, reduced cost, and
included more rural people in the banking sector (the main
goal of the policy in both countries) or other factors that
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may make adopting this practice advantageous over other
alternatives, including doing nothing.
Compatibility: In both countries, not only must
there be a favorable infrastructure to support the
biometric technology, there must also be favorable cultural
norms in support of it. Hence, the higher the similarity
with existing norms, the better the chances of adoption.
Thus, ideas that miss the Compatibility factor are often
described as "ahead of their time."

(Burkus, n.d.).

Therefore, both countries must have certain cultural norms
that do not defeat the perceived advantages that the
technology is likely to bring and perhaps most importantly,
the needed physical infrastructure must be present to
facilitate implementation. Religious beliefs, in both
countries for example, should not discourage the use of the
biometric payment system. As typical of most developing
countries especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, where
superstition reigns supreme, new policies are often given
certain religious and cultural interpretations. Therefore,
Compatibility issues in Ghana and South Africa can be
something as simple as not having the right resources
(communication facilities or infrastructure) to implement
the practice or could involve more philosophical concepts
such as concern over taking people's fingerprints for
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identification purposes which is an essential feature of
the biometric technology. Communication problems could be
manifested through constant breakdown of the system
inhibiting customer registration as well as transactions.
Where these problems abound in the countries, it is
expected to have adverse impact on the system's acceptance
by the public, hence, affects its usage.
Complexity: Here, residents in both countries

must find the biometric payment system an easy-to-use
product. If it is seen as highly complex or difficult to
grasp, people will shy away from engaging with the system.
If this is the case, complaints of the system will be rife
and sign-ups for the system's smartcard should remain low
or start declining if numbers initially rose. It therefore
follows that any attempts to reduce the complexity of the
system would increase usage of the system by card-bearing
members as well as encouraging others to sign-up for the
smartcards. Hence, not only would transaction volume
increase, the value of the transaction would increase as
well. Therefore, particularly in Ghana, the e-zwich system
should record greater number of subscribers and revenue
over time.
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Trialability: This feature means that there
must have been at least one pilot-based implementation of
the biometric payment system prior to a large-scale
implementation. The experiment on a smaller, less intensive
scale could have been undertaken on a regional level or in
a particular town or city in both countries. As the
framework suggests, the ability to experiment the
innovation on a smaller basis and the number of
experimentations determine the rate of adoption.
Consequently, the more the innovation is tried on a small
basis, the greater its success. And so, there must be
evidence in both countries to the effect that some form of
trials were initiated before broad-scale implementation.
Observability: Since Ghana's e-zwich system was
largely borrowed from South Africa, although with some
improvements or novelty features, and South Africa being
the first country to have implemented biometric technology
on the continent, it suffices to say that observability
will be higher in the former. The results of South Africa's
biometric system must have been very noticeable for Ghana
to have adopted similar technology. It should also be
continually learning from the experiences of the former.
This means that Ghana's biometric payment system must have
been an improvement over that of South Africa, entailing
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fewer challenges than what the latter faced. One way of
measuring this characteristic is to assess whether there
were any policy negotiations between actors (whether
private or public) of both countries concerning the
adoption and implementation of the system, with possible
exchanges between them. South Africa on the other hand, is
the first country in the world to employ biometric
technology in the distribution of social grants. Therefore,
observability is by all standards going to be low. It is
therefore expected that the biometric payment in place
should be fraught with major challenges, thereby, rendering
it ineffective. Any contrary evidence to this expectation
would be analyzed as a limitation to the generalizability
of Rogers' framework.
To surmise,

, Rogers (2003) argued that

innovations offering more relative advantage,
compatibility, simplicity, trialability, and observability
will be adopted faster than other innovations lacking these
attributes. Rogers does caution, "getting a new idea
adopted, even when is has obvious advantages, is difficult"
(p. 1), so the availability of all of these variables of
innovations speed up the innovation-diffusion process.
However, for Rogers, relative advantage is the strongest
predictor of the rate of adoption of an innovation.
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Nevertheless, it needs to be noted that this study is not
concerned with the 'rate' of adoption innovation or why
Ghana adopted the biometric system later than earlier.
Whether an innovation is adopted faster or slower, it still
needs to exhibit the characteristics that Rogers talk about
and this study emphasizes them as more crucial than the
speed with it the innovation is adopted.
Therefore the effectiveness of the e-zwich
system depends on the presence of these features in Ghana
as well as in South Africa. Effectiveness here means the
achievement of the goals of the system as purported or
perceived of the system by the Central Bank of Ghana which
are: for branchless banking, for financial inclusion and
lastly, for debit facilitation (Antwi, Hamza & Bavoh,
2015). Where all, not some, of these features are present,
the study concludes that it satisfied Rogers' framework,
hence all other things being equal, the e-zwich system
should achieve its objectives. On the other hand, the
absence of these characteristics casts a gloomy picture on
the system's effectiveness and its potential.
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CASE STUDIES
Ghana's Biometric Money

E-zwich, introduced in 2008 by the Central
Bank of Ghana is the world's first biometric money
(Breckenridge, 2010). It is a national switch payment
infrastructure for switching and clearing electronic
payments initiated at payment terminals owned by different
financial institutions with various types of payment cards
issued by these financial institutions.

(Breckenridge,

2010; Quansah, A., Andoh-Baidoo, F. K., & Midha, V., 2010;
Haruna, 2012). In other words, it is a centralized
mechanism for the settlement of transactions between the
Ghanaian banks as well as a biometric smartcard for secure
payment of goods and services.
This interbank switch was purchased from and
managed by the South African company Net 1 UEPS, and it had
a unique central organizing principle (Breckenridge, 2010)
The switch was indexed biometrically, using a key derived
from all ten fingerprints of account holders (Breckenridge,
2010). This new interbank switch and a smartcard encoded in
the same way afforded Ghana with the enviable position of
being the first country to supply biometric money supply.
However, the main aim of this study is not to focus on this
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novelty but to emphasize its functions which are basically
similar to other electronic payment systems in many parts
of the world, such as the MasterCard and Visa.
In 2006, Dr Paul Acquah, the then Governor of
the Central Bank, issued a tender for a national interbank
switch (a networked central database system that allows all
banking transactions to be settled) which was won by the
South African firm, Netl UEPS. The Ghanaian tender had
several features that distinguish it from similar interbank
settlement systems such as MasterCard and Visa. According
to the Governor, one of the key conditions, is for the
system to 'meet the requirements of the banked and the
unbanked' and provide a 'smartcard (based on biometric
identification payment system) which is compatible with the
national switch'-the national identity card.

(Breckenridge,

2010). It needs to be noted that there had been an earlier
attempt to develop a biometric national identity card,
which was locked in parliamentary discussions at the time
that the e-zwich idea was put forth by the Governor. The
owner of the firm, Serge Belamont, developed the SASwitch
in South Africa in the early 1980s, one of the largest and
earliest settlement systems in the world. The system
developed by UEPS as Belamant remarked so many times, is
aimed at the very poor, illiterate people who 'are not
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going to remember the pin number on the card'
(Breckenridge, 2010). This was also echoed by the Central
Bank governor, when he said that Netl's biometric smartcard
would mean that 'even in the remotest parts of the country
where electricity and telecommunication facilities are
unavailable' electronic banking had 'come to the doorstep
of all Ghanaians'

(Breckenridge, 2010). In other words, the

intention behind the policy was geared to the fact that
networked communications infrastructure, and electricity,
are largely absent in much of the African continent. Hence,
a central payment system should have features that would
allow transactions to be performed offline. Thus the ezwich system and its ability to perform offline
transactions is suited to the Ghanaian social fabric.
By the end of 2009, besides Ghana and Nigeria,
Netl UEPS had delivered large biometrically delivered
payment systems in place in South Africa, Namibia,
Botswana, Malawi and Iraq (Breckenridge 2005; 2008)
However, the UEPS system, is quite different from the
network-dependent settlement systems used by the EMV
(Europay, MasterCard and Visa), and most other banks. In
that, it stores the transaction data on the card itself.
Meaning, each card carries its own running balance, and a
history of up to eight-hundred transactions, that can be
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updated periodically through a networked machine
(Breckenridge, 2008). The e-zwich card also bears the
details of the issuing bank but unlike credit or debit
cards, they carry no individually identifying names and no
number. Furthermore, they are blank. This is a deliberate
design to discourage the incentive to steal the cards
because only the fingerprints of the owner can provide the
encryption key to access the bank account information

The

cards use a proprietary system of biometric encryption,
where the data is encoded using a template derived from the
user's fingerprint impressions (Breckenridge 2010).
However, the e-zwich cards are of little
importance to the tiny number of Ghanaians interested in
online shopping (Breckenridge, 2008. See also Ajao 2008) as
compared to the MasterCard and Visa cards used in developed
countries. Individuals can own more than one card just like
debit and credit cards. In order to make payments or switch
funds between the cards, users must find a working e-zwich
point-of-sale (POS) machine. The machines look like
conventional credit card authorization terminals, except
that they have fingerprint readers and a slot in the base of
the machine for the e-zwich card. The Ghanaian banks issue
the POS machines to merchant account holders, and merchants
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earn a small fee on transfers between card accounts paid
directly in their own accounts.
The Netl smartcard had been tried in South
Africa where the company gave out social grants to some 5
million people in the period after 2002

(Breckenridge,

2008; see also du Toit 2008; Belamant 2006). The e-zwich
system that was however delivered to Ghana by Netl and
which won the tender in June 2007 differed in some key
features from the one that was implemented in South Africa.
The Ghana Interbank Payment and Settlement System (GhIPSS)
was, in the first place, owned and authorized by the Bank of
Ghana, providing it with a legal protected monopoly of all
bank transactions. Unlike the Aplitec social grants system,
the Ghanaian contract had a full Automated Fingerprint
Identification System (AFIS) designed to store and match the
fingerprints of the entire population of card holders or
users. These novel features would have profound effects on
the modus operandi of the GhIPSS system, especially with
regard to the fact that the income from transactions on the
cards was under the aegis of the Central Bank
(Breckenridge, 2010).
The e-zwich project was hailed as having the
potential of accruing so many benefits despite so many
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difficulties that it faced. Even at its early
implementation stage, there were individuals that were
quite confident of the potential of the policy, in that the
expansion of the biometric banking card system was touted
as having some advantages over the national identification
programs that were even more catastrophic than the former.
A number of advantages of the e-zwich system over the
national identification system was put out there as reasons
for the potential success of the former. First, the state
has real influence over the provision of banking facilities.
Unlike the identity card systems, the Ghanaian biometric
banking system is a policed monopoly. "An immediate result
of the issuing of the GhIPSS tender to Netl was that the
older bank settlement systems were simply prohibited"
(Breckenridge 2008) . Towards the end of the year in which
the e-zwich system was launched, these companies and other
advocates of a free market in banking systems, began to
complain that the companies that had previously 'provided
switches and ATMs for various banks in the country, have
had their services declared illegal with immediate effect
(Breckenridge, 2010). Second, and perhaps an even more
important advantage, as argued by advocates of the policy,
is the state's control over many of the key points at which
paper money enters the economy. The crucial advantage of
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the e-zwich system per the proponents of the system,
irrespective of the difficulties in using the cards for
daily transactions is that it automates and controls the
state's payroll (Breckenridge 2010). At the launching of
the project the government promised that all salaried
employees and almost all the other sites of cash
transactions-'pensioners, churches, Controller and
Accountant General's Department (CAGD), Customs Excise and
Preventive Service (CEPS), Electricity Company of Ghana
(ECG), rural banks, Savings and Loans Companies and banks
would become part of the e-zwich system'

(GNA 2008a ) .

Years after the implementation of the project, it is only
recently that there is a serious attempt by the central
government to see this initiative through.
It was recently announced that the Controller
and Accountant- General's Department is expected to
commence the payment of all civil servants by a biometric
e-zwich platform in 2015. Again, the National Service
Scheme (NSS) , which oversees graduates of all tertiary
institutions serving compulsory national voluntary service,
recently took delivery of two-hundred and thirty point-ofsale-terminal (POS) e-zwich with which 2014-2015 service
personnel were paid. In reviewing the literature,
Breckenridge (2010) stated that the new government elected
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in 2008 under the presidency of John Atta Mills, also
decided to carry out the promise of the former regime,
anticipating 'the day when its employees will be paid
through the e-zwich as a means of minimizing the existence
of ghost workers in government's department payrolls". The
new administration persuaded the listed companies of the
Association of Ghana Industries (AG!) to use the cards,
arguing that they are more efficient in financial
transactions. Similarly, the Central Bank, in 2009, had a
lot of consultations with the key organizations of
recipients of cash payments-coffee growers, vegetable
farmers, schools-to persuade them to move their members
over to the smartcard system (most of the time inviting
banks to attend the meetings in order to sign up users on
the spot) .
Furthermore, it was quite easy for the Central
Bank to coerce the banks to adopt the system as it
instituted a regulation that required all banks to issue
the biometric cards at their own expense (Breckenridge
2010) . They were even required to use them for all
transactions, including electronic payments and cheque
clearing; even prepaid cellular call time had to be
compliant with the e-zwich (Breckenridge, 2010). Moreover,
officials also encourage small rural lenders to use the e-
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zwich cards to mobilize cash deposits for their banks. In
collaboration with each other, the banks and the officials
assigned to e-zwich embarked upon intense training programs
for merchants. Thus, the arrival of the e-zwich system
provided the potential for so many advantages for the
financial sector and for the economy at large.
Thus the potential of the system was quite rife
initially, especially heralded was the opportunity for
financial inclusion of rural folks which was emphasized by
the then president, John Kufuor's when he said that the ezwich cards had the potential to 'transform the financial
services industry and link it with every aspect of the
nation's economy' and his main concern was the inclusion of
the 'informal sector'

(Breckenridge, 2010). The Central

Bank governor, Paul Acquah also added that the e-zwich
cards provided a technological solution for the fact that
after five decades of independence some 80 percent of the
population still remained outside the banking system of the
country (Breckenridge, 2010). It is therefore imperative to
assess if the key objectives of the project, especially
with regard to financial inclusion of rural folks have been
largely realized or not.
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The Challenges of the E-Zwich System
The introduction of the e-zwich led to mass
registration of potential users and distribution of the ezwich smart card (Breckenridge, 2010; Boateng, Tetteh and
Boateng, 2015). However, as time went by and the euphoria
waned off despite intensive advertisement, the number
increased at a decreasing rate (Boateng, Tetteh and
Boateng, 2015). This raises the question as to why after
more than seven years after the introduction of the E-zwich
payment system, it has not been able to drastically reduce
if not eliminate cash transactions in the Ghanaian economy.
A year after the system had been introduced, a little over
two-thousand shop owners possessed these machines. The
cards usability, with regard to performing debit
transactions efficiently and effectively while maintaining
high satisfaction was brought into question by many
subscribers. That is, the cards were still far away from
transforming the economy into a cash-free one as initially
touted as a key benefit of the system. In June 2009, for
example,

a reporter in Accra described how, after loading

money onto his e-zwich card, he 'had to roam the city
looking for a fuel station which accepts the card, so he
could refuel his car'

(Breckenridge 2008; See also Thompson
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2008; Robertson 2008; Dogbevi 2009; GNA 2009b; Nonor 2009;
Staff Writer 2009b; Yeboah 2009a).
Furthermore, using and maintaining the
merchants' e-zwich machines were also difficult. There were
so many reports of angry e-zwich account holders struggling
fruitlessly to get the cooperation of shop attendants and
bank tellers. And for the shopkeepers, the machine, due to
its novel nature also portended chaos at the workplace as
card holders began to hold them responsible for their
unexpectedly depleted bank accounts.

'Some of the customers

come to us with the belief that they have money in their
cards only to be disappointed by the point of sale device',
one attendant complained;

'It's a lot of hell.'

(Breckenridge, 2010). Similarly, some shopkeepers reported
angry incidents with card holders who had been rejected
because the machine claimed that they were not the rightful
custodians of the card (Abdul-Rahman, Attah and Boafo 2009
in Breckenridge, 2010). The biometric encoding of the cards
also presented another problem as users frequently battled
to get the machines to read their fingerprints
successfully.
As Breckenridge argued, the most common
problems underlined the weakness of the communications

85

infrastructure in Ghana. Although the e-zwich has been
designed to support offline transactions between smartcards,
merchant owners of the POS machines were required to
reconcile their transactions with the central server at the
end of every working day or after eight-hundred
transactions (Breckenridge, 2010). This connection was
delivered though the unstable cellular network, which meant
that merchants had to have on hand, a regular supply of
electricity, sufficient prepaid airtime to complete the
connection and a reliable cellular single; These
difficulties with the system among others, prompted IMAN!,
the think tank, to state that the e-zwich system is
bedeviled with so many failures

(Breckenridge 2010) .

Moreover, all bank accounts in the e-zwich
system are also linked to the national identity number
(which, in turn, is linked to the biometric patterns in the
AFIS) , giving the Central Bank the power to record all the
transactions of all the individuals using the system.
Meaning in reality, the e-zwich records the biographical
details, the times, places, and amounts of all transactions
on the system. As it is currently set up all of this
information is controlled by Netl and instances of obvious
fraud are reported to the Central Bank. It is no surprise
that these extra features of the system have not been
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publicized; this central government regulation of the money
supply is contrary to arrangements that have existed in
West Africa for a very long time, and this presented an
augury for many Ghanaians to avoid the cards (Breckenridge,
2010).
Last but not least, in a largely superstitious
society, it came as little surprise that some individuals
attached religious interpretations to this project. There
were some Ghanaians who believed that e-zwich is one of the
many attempts in the 'global movement' towards the period
prophesied in Revelations whereby individuals could not
perform any financial transaction without having the mark
of the beast: popularly referred to as '666'. As Osei
(2008) stated, the constant publicity of the card on radio
and TV represented in the minds of some as the deliberate
attempt to promote Ghana as the pioneer in anti-Christian
activities in Africa.
South Africa's Biometric Payment System
South Africa holds the enviable position as the
country to have deployed biometric technology on the
continent. Breckenridge (2005) gives a useful account of
the development of biometric payment system in South
Africa; this study therefore draws heavily on the author's
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work. The earliest forms of computerized biometrics in
South Africa were aimed at regulating the movement and work
of laborers on the South African gold mines. Since then,
the technology has moved very rapidly beyond the world of
industrial work to the payment of social welfare benefits.
The first large-scale application of fingerprint-based
digital biometrics was in the delivery of pension benefits
in the former KwaZulu homeland in 1990. Faced with the task
of providing pensions to rural areas without anything
resembling infrastructure and no banking facilities of any
kind, the KwaZulu government accepted a tender from a joint
venture of First National Bank and Datakor, a locally owned
IT firm. The new company was called Cash Payment Services
(CPS), and it organized the distribution of pensions using
biometric identification that was, per international
standards quite mature, even though it was still at an
early stage of implementation; In 1996, CPS won the
Computerworld Smithsonian Institution's financial services
innovation award for its biometric identification software
(Breckenridge, 2005).

By the middle of the 1990s, CPS was

using four-wheel drive vehicles to distribute pensions in
the KwaZulu and Kangwane homelands to some 400,000
individuals. The system initially involved the digital
registration of fingerprints which were then stored on a
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magnetic strip card and on a central database. Pensioners
received their cash from the truck mounted dispenser after
pressing their forefinger onto a CPS scanner attached to a
computer.
As Breckenridge goes on to state, CPS provided
an adequate solution to the provincial states'
administrative and infrastructural incapacity, especially
in the risky distribution of cash pension payments in the
rural side. By the end of the 1990s, they were providing
pensions and unemployment benefits to over a million people
from some 5,000 fixed and mobile sites in six South African
provinces as well as in neighboring Namibia (Breckenridge,
2005). In KwaZulu-Natal, the company equipped post offices
with its fingerprint scanners to channel payments to
pensioners in the towns and cities. Later on however, this
single-purpose smartcard was to change. In 1999, CPS was
bought from First National Bank by Aplitec (its holding
company is Netl UEPS), an innovative South African IT
company that specializes in the development and manufacture
of smartcards. Henceforth, the fingerprint pension
distribution scheme was transformed into a much more
powerful multi-functional smartcard. Contrary to a direct
cash payment after presenting their fingerprints,
pensioners now received a credit directly onto their
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Aplitec smartcard, which can then be used immediately to
draw cash from an adjacent cash dispenser. But aside the
cards performing an identification tool, they were
primarily intended for the financial inclusion of the cash
economy of the rural pensioners like Ghana's e-zwich
system. In other words, to make the pensioners 'bankable'.
Ever since Aplitec took over the pension
distribution system, it has been able to reach so many
pensioners by providing a variety of services. Aplitec
began to offer automatic deduction facilities to a small
group of companies providing services including family
funeral policies and insurance policies. For example,
Cornestone, a life assurance company provided assurance
policies to 230,000 pensioners in KwaZulu-Natal and
Mpumalanga, using Aplitec's risk-free deduction facilities
provided by the smartcards (Breckenridge, 2005).
Challenges of the Kwazulu Biometric Payment System
Despite the successes of Aplitec's biometric
payment system in KwaZulu, it had certain drawbacks with
regard to attempts to make the system provide other new
services. In 1999, as Breckenridge (2005) writes, the
company partnered with the South African Local and Long
Distance Taxi and Bus Organization (SALLDTBO) to install
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smartcard readers on 20,000 taxis operating from the
organization's 200 ranks. By the end of that year they had
installed readers on about 2,000 taxis, but the taxi
installations have not been a success. The smartcard was
also originally intended to displace the use of cash
altogether in the payment of retail goods, and utility
bills. This effort to reorganize the cash economy around
the Aplitec smartcard seems, to date at least, to have
failed (Breckenridge, 2005).
Furthermore, the Black Sash, a non-violent
white women's resistance organization in South Africa
chastised Aplitec that its policy of automated deductions,
in which the most important choices of service provider and
payment are left in the control of Aplitec was at a
financial disadvantage to pensioners. The organization
reasoned that since Aplitec faces a significant decreased
risk in the provision of short-term loans to grant-holders,
hence a guaranteed regular repayments to its investors, the
company needs to provide discounts to the recipients of the
loans.
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Challenges of the Kwazulu Biometric Payment System
Despite these challenges, the company's hold on
the distribution of pensions in South Africa strengthened
to the effect that in 2002, it was awarded part of Eastern
Cape's pension grant distribution, giving them control of
more than 70 percent of the welfare and social grant system
in South Africa. Breckenridge stated that at the start of
2004, some 2.5 million recipients used Aplitec's biometric
smartcard at 7, 500 payout outlets to receive state pension
and child support grants. Due to its unprecedented success,
Aplitec installed smaller smartcard welfare schemes in six
other African countries. Furthermore, Aplitec was the only
IT company on the Johannesburg stock market whose share
price rose during the three years that followed the
collapse of the world IT bubble after March 2000
(Breckenridge, 2005). Breckenridge also notes that given
the high incidence of 'subsistence crime' in South Africa,
it was remarkable that technicians responsible for delivery
of these biometric systems in KwaZulu-Natal had never
experienced an attempt at biometric impersonation. That is,
they could not remember a particular instance where an
individual attempted to withdraw cash from a payout using
someone else's card. This, Breckenridge attests to the
'disciplinary success of CPS's biometric pension scheme'.
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The former Chief Minister of KwaZulu and then national
minister of Home Affairs, Mangosutho Buthelezi was so
impressed with the fingerprint-identified pensions scheme
that he first implemented that he resolved that a similar
scheme would serve as the basis of a new national identity
document.
Currently, CPS distributes social welfare
grants on a monthly basis to over nine million
beneficiaries in South Africa. These social welfare grants
are distributed on behalf of South African Social Security
Agency (SASSA) . The card has evolved over the years with
the holder having access to all of the U.E.P.S.
functionality, which includes the ability to have the smart
card funded with pension or welfare payments, make retail
purchases, enjoy the convenience of pre-paid facilities and
qualify for a range of affordable financial services,
including insurance and short-term loans as well as
standard EMV transactional capabilities to operate wherever
MasterCard is accepted ('Cash Paymaster Services', 2015).
The smart card also offers the card holder the ability to
make debit order payments to a variety of third parties,
including utility companies, schools and retail merchants,
with which the holder maintains an account. The card holder
can also use the same smart card as a savings account. Thus
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it performs basically the same functions as Ghana's e-zwich
card except that in the latter, it is not used for the
payment of pension and other welfare grants.
However, while CPS, under the aegis of Netl
UEPS manages the South African pension scheme, the e-zwich
is purely managed by the Central Bank of Ghana's
subsidiary, GhIPSS.

In March 2012, the South African

government engaged in a massive effort of citizen
registration that continued for more than a year. Much more
recently, nearly 19 million social welfare beneficiaries
enrolled in a novel biometric identification scheme that
uses fingerprints and voice recognition to authenticate
social grant recipients (Donovan, 2013). However, the
purpose of this paper does not incorporate this new
biometric identification effort but rather dwells on that
biometric technology that employed the use of fingerprints
only.
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CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS/DISCUSSIONS
The E-zwich and Rogers' Characteristics of Innovation
As Rogers argues, for any innovation to be
adopted in a host country, it needs to offer some advantage
that the existing innovation does not, must be compatible
with existing values, past experiences, and needs of
potential adopter, must be easy to understand and use and
last but not least, it must be able to be tried or piloted
for a number of times. But as the author contends, the
'cost or the social motivation status' that the innovation
provides relative to the existing one, is the most
important factor that should influence the rate of
adoption. The critical question here therefore is, did
Ghana's e-zwich policy exhibit these features

(without

proffering any particular measurement) to warrant its
adoption?
Relative Advantage: With regard to relative
advantage, the e-zwich system and for that matter, most
biometric technologies bring with it certain advantages to
a financial or banking system of any country. Prior to the
e-zwich, there was no technology that performed the multivaried functions that the e-zwich affords to customers. The
system performs three broad banking transactions-savings,
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cash withdrawal and cash deposit, aside debit transactions.
The e-zwich card currently has four wallets activated.
These are; Primary, Savings, Transport and Secondary. Funds
maintained in the savings wallet may attract interest based
on the rate payable by the issuer bank. Interest is
calculated daily by the switch and credited at the end of
the month to the client card's host balance. A 10-digit
code is then created for the card to load either manually
on the POS using the code and amount (offline) or
automatically through a communication network (Online) .
Cash withdrawal involves the reduction of the electronic
value stored on an e-zwich card in exchange for cash. This
can be done by a bank Teller or at by a retail merchant.
The process involves the verification of the cardholder and
the update of the funds on a client's card by the e-zwich
device (POS or ATM) . Cash withdrawal transactions are also
offline transactions and do not require communications with
a third party server. It can therefore be completed
anywhere in the country.
There is currently no limit to how much can be
withdrawn from an e-zwich card except where the client has
placed a limit during enrolment. For merchants,

(bank

Tellers and Retail) cash paid-out to e-zwich clients are
credited to their bank accounts the day after settlement of
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their POS devices. The e-zwich card can hold cash deposits
for its cardholders in the same way that money can be
deposited into bank accounts. The funds deposited on a card
remains on it until it is used at a POS or e-zwich ATM.
Cash deposits can be done from any e-zwich bank regardless
of the bank that issued the client card. Thus a card issued
at bank A can deposit funds at bank B. Keeping money on an
e-zwich card is therefore the same as keeping it in a bank
account. The added advantage of an e-zwich card is that
when needed, the funds can be accessed from multiple
institutions including other banks and retail merchants.
There is also no limit to the amount of money
that can be deposited on the card. There is also no fee
charged for this transaction. Cash deposit is typically
done by a bank Teller. Retail merchants can however add
this to their sleuth of transactions as long as they
allocate funds to be converted to e-money to through their
banks. A retail merchant that performs cash deposit is
referred to as a merchant agent. Money deposited on an ezwich card is protected by the biometric data
(fingerprints) of the cardholder. The e-zwich card is also
easy to obtain as it is issued for free by the banks as
compared to ATM cards. Moreover, purchases or payments made
by individuals using the e-zwich smartcard will not attract
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any fees even though you will be charged a small fee for
money transfers, cash withdrawals and some other
transactions. However, as Agyeiwaa, Anane, Appiah, & OpokuWare (2014) stated in their findings on the challenges with
the e-zwich faced by both users and non-user customers of
Ghana Commercial Bank, some respondents did not consider
the affordability of e-zwich as a challenge as more than
half of the respondents disagreed (70%) to this statement.
Conversely, using VISA ATM cards issued by one bank on
another bank's ATM attracts a charge ranging from 3 to 5
cedis depending on the bank which is relatively costly. And
so in this regard, the e-zwich system trumps the VISA ATM
card in terms of affordability.
Security-wise, the e-zwich card is deemed as
highly secure as typical of smartcards. The most common
method of securing e-payments is using cryptographic based
technologies such as encryption and digital signatures
(Taddesse & Kidan, 2005 in Kumaga, 2010) . Data stored on a
smart card is encrypted and cannot be assessed without
password/PIN and thus provide strong security.

To this

end, Taddesse & Kidan (2005) argue that magnetic strip
cards i.e. debit cards, credit cards etc are being replaced
by smart cards. Thus, the e-zwich card provides a greater
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form of security that 'existing' technology such as the
VISA and MasterCard.
On a more policy level, the e-zwich has aided
in the eradication of some ghost names in the country's
payroll system. Recently, the acting Executive Director of
the National Service Scheme (NSS), Dr Michael Kpessa-Whyte,
told the Daily Graphic in an exclusive interview that
control measures activated by the new management of the
Secretariat have prevented about 75,000 ghost names from
entering the service payroll in the 2014/2015 service year
("75,000 Ghost Names Removed From NSS Payroll; Saving
GH¢26.5m", 2015). Most importantly, the e-zwich card
presents an opportunity for financial inclusion of the
rural poor, thereby helping to transform the economy into a
cashless economy.
Compatibility: Compatibility is the extent to
which an innovation is perceived as consistent with the
existing values, past experiences, and needs of potential
adopters. In the case of the e-zwich, it means that bank
officials who would be responsible for the maintenance of
the finger print readers in the ATMs and the merchants who
would operate the POS must have the needed skills for
success in their duties as well as the infrastructural base
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to support this new technology. Breckenridge (2010) noted
that within a month of the project's launch, only a
'handful' of local banks had achieved the networking
threshold required of them by the Central Bank.
Furthermore, the installation of hole-in-the wall ATMs, a
new feature, which according to Breckenridge (2010) had
never formed part of Netl's infrastructure in South Africa,
proved difficult and costly. Moreover, it was only in
December, after the project was launched in April 2008 that
the Britain-based De La Rue managed to deliver a handful of
the machines. Breckenridge, further noted that the
commercial banks in the country were more interested in
providing ATMs for the local and foreign customers who
wanted to use off shore EMV-compatible VISA cards than
servicing the e-zwich account holders. Thus the financial
interest in VISA cards far exceeded that of e-zwich
smartcards even though the banks were mandated to roll out
the project as soon as possible.
Taddesse & Kidan,

(2005) note that

infrastructure is necessary for the successful
implementation of electronic payments. Although, the ezwich system was hailed as being compatible with rural
settings due to its offline feature,

infrastructural issues

hampered the use of e-zwich (Kumaga, 2010 and Agyeiwaa,
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Anane, Appiah, & Opoku-Ware, 2014).
Anane, Appiah, & Opoku-Ware (2014)

For example, Agyeiwaa,
indicated that

statements like "ICT accessibility is a challenge for ezwich usage" recorded as much as 90.3% of agreement by
respondents. With the country plagued with energy crisis
for over three years now, respondent highlighted the
severity of this problem with regard to the usage of the ezwich card; as many as 98.8% of the respondents agreed to
this statement. Compatibility is not only assessed by the
availability of electricity but also by telecommunication
and the internet. Electronic payments communication
infrastructure includes computer network such as the
internet and mobile network used for mobile phone. In
addition, banking activities and operations need to be
automated. Mobile network and internet are readily
available in the developed world and users usually do
rarely have problems with communication infrastructure.
This is however not the situation in Africa as mobile
networks and internet are not easily accessible.
"Poor communication infrastructure is one of
the reasons that hinder the e-payment system in Africa"
(Kumaga, 2010. See also Taddesse & Kidan, 2005). Kumaga
noted that although e-zwich works offline, an online
connection is needed for POS devices at the end of each day
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to perform settlements. This is normally enabled and
facilitated by any of the local mobile telecommunication
companies. This connection is sometimes not successful
thereby frustrating the users. The success of data transfer
is dependent on bandwidth availability and signal strength
in the area which is usually low in that part of the world.
This is usually worst beyond the major cites of Accra and
Kumasi, the two biggest towns in the country (Boateng,
Tetteh and Boateng, 2015).

The issue of infrastructure is

evidenced when the German government provided 8 million
euros as a soft loan for the development of the e-zwich
infrastructure ("GhIPSS Secures 8 Million Euros German Soft
Loan For E-Zwich Infrastructure", n.d.). In fact, Kwame
Ansah, Head of Payment System at the Central Bank remarked:
"Unfortunately, the e-zwich has not done well mainly
because at the time that BoG was advertising and getting people to be
interested in the system, the necessary infrastructure like the point
of sale terminals (POSs) and ATMs had not been adequately put in
place."

("Expert Explains E-zwich Glitch", 2012).

Kumaga (2010) further stated that there are
network connectivity problems when issuing new cards.
Issuing e-zwich cards is an online activity hence requires
connectivity which is sometimes an issue and depends on
signal strength and bandwidth availability of the mobile
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telecommunication company at the time of connection.
GhIPSS, prior to the implementation of the system,
anticipated that accessibility and usability through
efficient operations of the telecommunication systems and
managerial and operational issues as the number one
challenge of the system. Yet, years after the
implementation of the project, this problem still persists.
Extending this definition, Ram (1987) states that
'compatibility represents not only consistency with the
existing values of the consumer, but also with traditional
and cultural values, and with current lifestyles of the
consumer'. Hence, as Breckenridge (2010) noted, some
Ghanaians interpreted the e-zwich system as a sign of the
biblical 'end-times'. This opposition is consistent with
their religious beliefs, therefore forming a hesitant
stance on the system.
Complexity: Here, Rogers describe as "the

degree to which an innovation is perceived as relatively
difficult to understand and use" is an important obstacle
to the adoption of an innovation. Ghana for so long is used
to hearing that only 20% of its population is banked and
with greater percentage of its population uneducated, it is
quite straightforward to perceive the usability of the
system by residents especially, those in the rural areas.
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You would expect policy makers to anticipate that only few
people would be able to perform transactions with the
system, considering the self-use requirement for certain
transactions such as money transfer. Kumaga (2010) offers
some interesting findings based on his interview with some
users of e-zwich. First, he observes that most users do not
understand and appreciate the benefits of electronic
banking to individuals and the society as a whole. He
therefore argues that this has therefore made them hesitant
and slow to adapt to 'new economic reality leading to poor
patronage, lost opportunities and diminished
competitiveness' in the financial sector. The few
individuals who are willing to use electronic cards have
difficulty in finding avenues to use electronic cards. They
sometimes get frustrated and convert their money to cash in
buying items instead of using their cards. Second, the few
Ghanaians who 'understand' electronic transactions are
still into traditional banking and cash transactions. As
people form habit of doing one activity over and over
again, they become comfortable with it, hence reducing
their inclination to try out new things. Ram (1987)
therefore contends that the vast majority of people who
have no a priori desire to change may be more typical and
even more rational than a small minority of individuals who
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seek change for its own sake rather than or in addition to
the intrinsic value of the innovations. In sum, Kumaga
(2010) states that e-products are highly patronized by
literates (which form a small percentage of the population
relative to illiterates) since they have the requisite
skill for its use. This problem, aside accessibility issues
therefore undermines the motive of the Central bank to make
those in the rural areas bankable.
GhIPSS, the institution charged with managing
the system, also acknowledged that lack of knowledge and
skills in basic computing identified was a significant
factor affecting electronic payment systems in Ghana
(Boateng, Tetteh and Boateng, 2015). Not only lack of
technical knowledge of how to use the system or card (basic
computing), but lack of knowledge by individuals on the
benefits and what the system provides is also a problem
(Boateng, Tetteh & Boateng, 2015) . This affects both the
merchants and the consumers alike.

Trialability: The ability of an innovation to
be tried on a small basis prior to its launch on a grand
scale is also cited by Rogers (2003) as contributory to the
rate of adoption of the innovation, and for the purposes of
this study, to its success. The e-zwich was not at any
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level or at any point in time implemented on a smaller
scale before a national project was launched. Surprisingly
however, none of the extant literature identified above
mentions this problem as one of the reasons for the
observed ineffectiveness of the system. Ram (1987) reasons
that:
If, for instance, a product based on an entirely new
technology cannot be tried by the consumer prior to purchase, then the
consumer is likely to perceive a high level of risk in purchasing the
product. If on the other hand, the consumer has a successful trial with
the product, the risk associated with the product is likely to
decrease.

Merchants were taught how to use the point-ofsale devices through mass training program organized by the
Central Bank in conjunction with the commercial banks, but
only after the project had been launched. For the e-zwich
card holder, no such training was available; the individual
has to rely on his or her basic computing knowledge. Only
when such individual faced difficulty is he compelled to
seek help from a bank official, that is, if the ATM machine
is on the premises of the bank. In locations where the
machines where detached from banks, it means the individual
cannot use his or her card. How to use the card was
advertised on TV as well as individual banks providing
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flyers for customers who pass through the banks,
nevertheless, people struggled to comprehend the use of the
cards. Ram (1987), further reasons that the concept of
divisibility of innovation is related to trialability.
Divisibility measures whether an innovation can be
attempted in stages. The lower the trialability of an
innovation, the higher the innovation of resistance. The
lower the divisibility of an innovation, the higher the
innovation resistance. By all means, the e-zwich system was
not developed and implemented in phases. Commercial banks
were hastily rushed into the implementation of the system
with the Central Bank of Ghana instituting regulations to
force them to abide by the rules.
Observability: The degree to which the results
of biometric payment systems elsewhere could be said to
have been visible to Ghana especially that of South Africa
who had been implementing biometric payment for a
considerable number of years before the former decided to
adopt the technology. Furthermore, besides South Africa,
Netl UEPS had delivered payment system in Namibia and
Botswana, hence, opportunities for drawing contrasting
lessons from these countries were there. Moreover, it was a
South-African company that had installed the technology in
Ghana and as Breckenridge (2010) indicated, the e-zwich
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system albeit sharing some features with the South African
biometric payment system, had features that were an
improvement over the latter. Therefore, ceteris paribus,
the e-zwich system was supposed to achieve significant
positive results based on policy learning. It is a fact
that the-the KwaZulu biometric payment system had also
faced certain challenges and positive results at its
initial stages that Ghana's e-zwich could have learnt from;
poor service delivery, specifically, long queues at pay
points which was also identified by Antwi, Hamza, Bavoh
(2015) as one of the problems facing the e-zwich system. In
short, the e-zwich clearly satisfied this characteristic of
innovation.
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South Africa's Biometric Payment System and the
Characteristics of Innovation
Relative Advantage: South Africa's biometric
system implemented in Kwazulu like the e-zwich system in
Ghana, afforded the country some relative advantages. By
virtue of it being the first country in Sub-Saharan Africa
to adopt this technology, it is almost certain that the
country was bound to enjoy certain benefits, especially
with regard to the social status or prestige that the
technology presents. South Africa therefore became the
pioneer in the implementation of biometric technology and
served as the point of reference especially for fellow
countries in Southern Africa. As it turned out, Netl UEPS,
a wholly-owned South African company, installed biometric
technologies not only in neighboring Malawi, Botswana and
Namibia, but in West African countries of Ghana and West
Africa as well as in Iraq. The company is private-owned,
nevertheless, it represents the country wherever it goes
and for this reason, it could be said that it rubs on the
status of the country.
Most importantly, the biometric payment system
was implemented in KwaZulu (also known as Zululand), a
rural setting, hence, the system was able to include those
beneficiaries into the financial sector. This was even more
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so when Aplitec added other financial services like
provision of short-term credit to grant holders in the
system. This service has given millions of unbanked South
Africans access to banking services and improved the
banking culture of the rural population. Thus,

'they will

now be able to utilize their smart cards as a fully
operational bank account protected by their biometric
profile'

('Smart(er) KZN pension cards', 2003). The

biometric system was also implemented with the aim of
reducing fraud and corruption in the distribution of the
pension benefits. As Breckenridge (2014) stated, the
adoption of the 'expensive' biometric payment system was
downplayed by the 'elimination of invisible pilferage of
millions of rands a year'. Thus while the system itself was
expensive, the potential of it reducing fraud necessitated
the adoption of the technology.
Compatibility: With regard to compatibility (in

technical terms), one of the intentions to adopt biometric
technology was its ability to work in a limited
infrastructural capacity especially inherent in rural
areas. Relative to Ghana, however, the biometric system has
been successful in this regard; "South Africa's approach
provides a useful alternative for a sparse country with
limited internet and cell network coverage"

(Gelb, &
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Decker, 2011). Much of the problem faced by the system has
more to do with logistics than infrastructural issues,
however, Breckenridge (2005) does not totally equate out
this problem. For example, in responding to grant-holders
waiting for many hours before receiving their benefits,
Aplitec blamed it on the poor electronic record-keeping in
the region of Kwazulu by government officials. Breckenridge
also notes that the problem, to some extent, highlighted
the conflict between private companies and elected
officials in the dispensation of most state transactions.
Thus, in South Africa, it appears that the
problem of infrastructure and thus compatibility issues
were at least, minimal. However, it has to be noted that
the KwaZulu biometric payment system did not initially
employ the use of biometric smartcards as was the case in
Ghana, therefore explaining the relative less reliance on
computing skills on the part of users. This was probably
because, while in Ghana, a user basically conducts the
transactions by him or herself (unless in retail
transactions where all that the card-holder does is swipe
his or her in the POS device), the biometric system in
place in KwaZulu was taken to grant-holders (via four-wheel
drive vehicles) and all that they have to do is press their
forefinger onto a specially designed scanner attached to a

111

computer. In Ghana, on the other hand, users have to know
basic computing skills to be able to perform transaction
with the biometrically-enabled ATMs. Thus, the South
African system required less of computational skills than
the e-zwich system, hence accessibility was greatly
enhanced in the former.
Furthermore, Cash Payment System (CPS), the
first company charged with the distribution installed
fingerprint scanners in post off ices to channel payments to
pensioners in the towns and cities also. And so as
Breckenridge (2005) indicated, the biometric technology
provided a 'compelling remedy to the provincial states
administrative and infrastructural incapacity. It has to be
noted that the KwaZulu system did not have multifunctionality as was the case in Ghana, hence, explains
users less reliance on basic computing skills. However,
since 2003, KwaZulu-Natal pensioners have been using their
smart cards to buy goods at certain stores where they can
also draw cash (Vecchiatto, 2003).
Complexity: Tied to accessibility is complexity
or usability which is determined by the "degree to which an
innovation is perceived as relatively difficult to
understand and use". Like Ghana, the expected action of
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policy makers would have been to not conceive the thought
of employing this technology in view of the predominantly
rural setting of the KwaZulu region. However, due to the
simplicity of the technology, it was largely user-friendly;
as indicated above, all that grant-holders had to do was
press their thumbprint onto a scanner attached to a
computer to receive payment. Even with the advent of
additional services such as retail payment and cash
withdrawal, transactions are facilitated by the merchants
who only ask for the fingerprint of the users. In other
words,

"Beneficiaries will also be able to purchase goods

and withdraw cash, in an offline environment, from the
merchants participating in the payment system (Vecchiatto,
2003). Thus, in South Africa, the issue of complexity is
virtually nonexistent or less marked relative to the
situation in Ghana.
Trialability: Like the e-zwich system, the

KwaZulu biometric payment was not tried on a smaller scale
before it was launched on the regional level even though
the system itself later on became the foundation for a
national payment system. And so by Rogers (2003) reasoning,
such innovation's ability to survive in the long run is
highly limited. However, despite its inability to try the
system on a smaller scale, it has fared better than the e-
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zwich. As of now, the e-zwich, since it was introduced into
the country in 2008 has enrolled a little above 1 million
but the volume of transactions of the card is dwindling,
which has been so for the past three years ("E-Zwich
Spending Swells", 2003). Presently, Netl Cash Payment
Systems in South Africa on the other hand, distributes
social welfare grants on a monthly basis to over nine
million beneficiaries in South Africa ('Cash Paymaster
Services', n.d.). In another report, Gelb (2012)

indicated

that the system was extended, across the entire country, in
some cases with changes, and distributed grants to over 15
million beneficiaries.

After four years of negotiations to

provide smartcards to pensioners, the KwaZulu-Natal
government finally awarded the contract to Aplitec in 2004
and in that same year, some 2.5 million recipients used the
card at 7,500 payout points to receive state pension funds
and child grants (Breckenridge, 2005). In Ghana, however,
it was later in December (after the launch in April) that a
'handful' of ATMs with fingerprints readers were installed
(Breckenridge, 2010) and the number of enrollment was
nowhere near that of the former. After a year of
implementation, only "2,500 merchants had installed the
biometric point-of-sale machines, and just over 300,000
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people had been issued with the cards"

(Breckenridge,

2010).
Observability: By being the first country to
have deployed biometric payment technology on the African
continent

and in the world (Breckenridge, 2014) and indeed

as the pioneer in biometrically-delivered direct cash
transfer, the observability characteristic advocated by
Rogers as necessary in influencing the adoption of an
innovation was clearly nonexistent in the policy decision.
There was little to virtually no results elsewhere to
compare its biometric payment system to and learn from.
This is compounded by the fact that no trials of the system
were performed to assess its feasibility before it was
wholly adopted. Thus, the biometric payment technology
employed in South Africa was an original idea that was
liable to high level of risk as compared to the situation
in Ghana's e-zwich system. However, rather than drawing
back the system, the 'success' of Netl system in South
Africa is not in contention. As of 2008, 4 million people
in South Africa were receiving state welfare or pension
payments through the system ("Tackling The Security
Challenge", 2008) and as indicated earlier, the number has
risen significantly over the years.
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The final section of the study assesses the
effectiveness of the e-zwich system relative to South
Africa's biometric payment system on one hand, and examines
the applicability of Rogers' characteristics of innovation
in the implementation of the biometric payment systems in
the two countries on the other hand. The study then
provides some suggestions as regards the way forward for
the e-zwich system.
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION
The main aim of this study was two-fold; to
assess the effectiveness of the e-zwich system in Ghana
through Rogers'

(2003) framework on the characteristics of

innovation and in consequence, testing the validity of the
framework. He contends that for any innovation to be
successfully adopted in any country, it has to have exhibit
his characteristics of innovation including relative
advantages, compatibility, complexity, observability and
trialability. The higher the evidence of these
characteristics (with the exception of complexity which has
an inverse relation with the rate of adoption) in the
adopting country, the higher the likelihood of the
innovation to be successful upon implementation. By this
account, the study sought to find out whether the e-zwich
system was adopted in Ghana because these characteristics
were existing prior to implementation as well as existing
currently. If they were, then ceteris paribus, this
biometric payment system should demonstrate high success
and an even greater potential in the future. Where the
system is deemed or found to be highly ineffective, it is
logical to conclude that the biometric payment technology
or innovation adopted lacked Rogers' characteristics.
Conversely, where most of the characteristics of
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innovations were absent, yet the innovation has achieved
relative success, it makes sense to say that Rogers'
framework is not a sufficient condition for the adoption of
innovation by a particular country and neither does it
adequately predict the success of the innovation in the
country.
The e-zwich policy is still being touted as
having immense potential after seven years of its
implementation and the recent loan provided by the German
government to help improve the technology of the system
further raises some hope for the future success of the
system. Furthermore, the e-zwich seems to have met Rogers'
characteristics of innovation, especially with regard to
the 'perceived' relative advantages that the system was
supposed to bring. However, plenty challenges still abound.
Definitely, any technology that is being considered by a
state would be perceived to bring with it some advantages
and Rogers' indicate that is the most important factor in
influencing adoption decisions of decision-makers. However,
it is not difficult to argue that the real problems in
adopting an innovation especially with regard to the
success of its implementation would depend on that
particular environment in which it is being adopted. Issues
of compatibility and complexity can be considered as more
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crucial in this regard than the issue of relative
advantages, especially in developing countries where the
level of literacy in general and financial literacy for
such financial innovation employed in both South Africa and
Ghana could be vital to the success of that innovation. But
the case of South Africa's biometric payment system seems
to belittle these two characteristics of innovation as the
technology has been relatively successful with major
challenges of the system attributed to logistical problems
such as inadequate and inaccurate data maintained by the
local government in maintaining the records of the citizens
(Breckenridge, 2005). This problem can easily be remedied
but severe structural problems such as communication
problems causing delays in the registration of potential
subscribers of the e-zwich system as well as lack of
understanding on the usage of the e-zwich card is a call
for concern.
As has been shown, the potential relative
advantages and observability of the innovation were obvious
prior to adoption. It was supposed to bring in the nonilliterate population to the financial sector, facilitate
transactions and interbank payments between the commercial
banks and a host of other advantages that the technology
could bring. What was particularly hailed about the system
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was its potential to reduce the problem of carrying large
sums of cash around that created inconveniences (Asante,
Boahene, Boakye, & Hagan, 2011). However, the success of
the system has not gone down so well and this can be
attributed to non-existent support systems in
compatibility, complexity and to some extent trialability.
Even though the system is designed to alleviate certain
communication problems.
One worthy point to be noted in the success of
South Africa's biometric payment is the role of the
government in accelerating the patronage of the system.
While the system is being managed by Cash Payment System
(CPS) on behalf of the South-African government, the option
of either signing up for the card or risk losing your
social benefits has largely contributed in large numbers of
beneficiaries being rolled up into the scheme. And so IMANI
Ghana reckons that the problem with the e-zwich system is
largely "strategic" rather than "technical"

( "IMANI Alert:

E-Zwich Becoming a Colossal Waste of Resources?" 2010). On
the basis of the scope of its ambition it was always
expected that some technical difficulties would be
encountered, and that these will be assuaged as time goes
on and with increasing patronage. Even the most proven
systems require a period of time to attain stability.
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However, as the think-tank explains, right from the
beginning, the policymakers and the managers of the e-zwich
program made "systemic strategic mistakes that considerably
weakened its prospects at the get-go". The biggest of these
mistakes, it continues, was the failure to "separate the
electronic switch and supporting gateways, the biometric
identification backbone, and the consumer smartcard and POS
terminal services from one another". IMANI reasons that:
The electronic switch could have been the
province of the Bank of Ghana, which could have also
managed the biometric backbone on behalf of the public
until the NIA (National Identification Authority) was ready
to assume that function. A whole range of services could
have then relied on the biometric backbone - NHIS (National
Health Insurance Scheme), Electoral Commission, DVLA
(Drivers & Vehicles Licensing Authority), Ghana Passport
Office, and e-zwich itself. The result would have been a
more efficient, a more ready-to-go, harmonized, and
integrated national identification system, instead of the
haphazard, fragmented, and frankly ridiculous system we
have now, in which several agencies are falling over
themselves to implement their own biometric databases,
leading to great delays and outrageous cost overruns.
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Another strategic problem is the prolonged
inability of the Central Bank of Ghana initial promise that
all public servants would have their monthly salaries paid
onto their e-zwich cards. It is only recently that serious
attempts have been made to actually implement this policy
on a wide scale. This problem, according to Asante et al,
2011 can be attributed to government's lack of commitment
to this initiative since most of the implementation of the
project has been left in the hands of GhIPSS.
In their literature review, Asante, Boahene,
Boakye & Hagan (2011) indicate that "implementation of
electronic payment system is as a result of the behavior
adopted by customers during transactions" And so Rogers'
was right to state that one of the characteristics
necessary for the successful adoption of innovations is
complexity; that is,

"how difficult it is for adopters to

learn to use an innovation"

(Yocco, 2015) . E-zwich

transactions have truly validated Cobb's assertion, but on
a negative note as citizens on many occasions have
struggled to get their fingerprints read by the POS
machines and sometimes being turned away by merchants when
machine indicated that they were not the rightful owners of
the e-zwich cards. Years after the implementation of the
policy, some individuals still experience this difficulty.
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Thus it is evident that the seemingly coercive
strategy adopted by the South-African government as
compared to the soft-stance (on citizens especially) of the
Government of Ghana over the years has largely been
instrumental in rolling more individuals into its biometric
payment system. Ironically however, the role of the
privately-run CPS can be hardly disputed to have
contributed in boosting the effective running of the
system. Does the success of the South Africa's system which
is managed by a private-firm serve as useful lesson to
Ghana to award the management of the e-zwich system to
(which is controlled by the Bank of Ghana through GhIPSS)
to a tried and tested private-firm like CPS? IMANI for
example believes that the consumer smartcard part of the ezwich program, which is represented by the smartcards
themselves and the point of sales terminals, should
definitely have been left in the hands of the many privatesector developers of electronic payment solutions already
working in Ghana. The competition would have mitigated
disastrous decisions such as were taken by GhIPPS at the
start of the initiative to require merchants to purchase
the terminals. This seriously slowed adoption and
attenuated the initial drive of the program. This it
contends was a huge marketing mistake as money was thrown
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into adverts and yet potential customers could not see the
terminals anywhere. In a society with predominantly
impulse-driven market behavior it is quite difficult to
ascertain the effect of advertising on consumer choices.
Although observability was evident in the
innovation of the e-zwich system by virtue of the country
having an advantage from the opportunity in learning from
the results of the KwaZulu payment system, this did not and
has still not helped in the implementation of the system.
This reinforces the above point that perhaps in the case of
the e-zwich system, the problem has to do more with
strategic decisions made by officials at the Central Bank
as well as GhIPSS rather than technicalities such as
compatibility and complexity issues that Rogers state as
important in the adoption process. Rogers does not address
the importance of the ability of the innovation to be
divided into smaller phases or stages during the trial
process. Ram (1987) filled this gap by stating that the
more an innovation is tried in smaller doses prior to fullscale implementation, the better for the innovation to
succeed in the long run. According to the Central Bank of
Ghana, the e-zwich program was supposed to be carried out
in three stages; the first phase included the installation
of the switch host, establishment of networks and issuing
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of biometric smartcards by banks to clients as well as
deployment of POS terminals by banks at specific acquired
merchants and in bank branches (Asante et al, 2011). This
phase, according to the Central Bank was completed and led
to the launch of the e-zwich system on April 28, 2008.
Phases two and three are unfortunately yet to
be materialized and the future of them coming into fruition
is quite bleak to say the least. According to the Bank's
2008 annual report, phase two involved the introduction of
new ATMs into the system and modifying existing ones to
accept both biometric smartcards and Personal
Identification Numbers (PIN) based magnetic stripe cards
and the inclusion of mobile banking onto the switch (Asante
et al). But this phase has not been fully incorporated as
planned. ATMs are located in few designated places
throughout the country. In some places such as Western,
Central, Upper West and Upper East regions there is

ATM

in

only one location. Interestingly, these regions, especially
the last two, represent the two most rural areas in the
country. This reality therefore questions the real
intention of policymakers to make the e-zwich system a
means for financial inclusion of people in these regions.
The last phase of the program was to incorporate e-zwich
with the card systems of major international card
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associations such as VISA and MasterCard so that these
different cards can be accepted at the same payment outlets
in Ghana (Asante et al, 2011). This phase has been
implemented but with mixed results. The Gh-Link Point of
Sale, which was introduced four years in 2012, after the
launch of the program ("GhIPPS Introduces GH-Link Card",
2012) accepts both e-zwich and ATM cards for payment but
only available at selected shops and supermarkets, about
eighteen in total. This paltry amount of these POS also
limits access to the system and undoubtedly defeats the
financial inclusion of rural folks as the Gh-Link POS is in
place at large urban centers than in rural areas. It is
therefore little wonder that the greater chunk of e-zwich
card issues made so far, the distribution is overwhelmingly
urban and peri-urban. And so the e-zwich appears to have
been implemented in phases, but the haphazard nature of its
implementation provides allows room to suggest that it was
rarely carried out in stages or to reason that it was
'planned' to be but not actually implemented as such.
Besides, Ram's argument has to do with divisibility at the
trial stage but not after the broad-scale launch of the
program. Thus even if we agree that the e-zwich was
implemented in stages, it was not undertaken during any
try-out process of the program.
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Furthermore, by virtue of its ad hoc
implementation, it can also be argued that the
implementation of the various phases was necessitated by
lack of adequate resources to make the program fully
operational, rather than a conscious attempt to do so. This
perhaps explains why even though GhIPPS purchased a
whopping 3 million of the biometric smartcards in advance
they were only able to issue out a paltry 10% as of 2012,
four years after the launch of the system ("IMANI Alert: EZwich Becoming A Colossal Waste of Resources", 2012.). This
led NET 1, in various calls with analysts and in regulatory
announcements to create the impression that there was a
deliberate slowdown in card issuance by the Ghanaian
authorities in order to allow infrastructure to catch up
with mass marketing drive by authorities to accelerate the
adoption of e-zwich cards. Seven years down the line,
authorities are still trying to boost the needed
infrastructure to support the system as evident in the
recent loan promised to GhIPSS by the German government to
help in this effort.
So from all indications, the e-zwich system has
fallen short of its expectations when gauged against
Rogers' characteristics of innovation. The expectations lie
in its relative advantages, but the success and

127

sustainability of the program lie in its compatibility
(infrastructural and cultural support) and complexity
(access and usage) and these two have not helped in this
regard. The KwaZulu biometric payment on the other hand,
has not only survived, but has increased its number of
enrollment and usage since its implementation in 1999 and
there are no signs of slowing down. Albeit the system
lacked in key prerequisites of innovation adoption per
Rogers' postulate, it has achieved success that would have
been expected of an innovation that was new to the country
and continent at large. The KwaZulu system lacked clearly
in observability, trialability and to some extent
compatibility (logistical problems). However, the ease and
usage (complexity) of the system, although some challenges
were noted,

(long waiting times for trucks carrying the

system) did not hinder its adoption in neighboring
provinces and the system has indeed gone national.
Does the success of the South African system
therefore offer credence to Rogers' assertion that the most
important characteristic among the other characteristics of
innovation is relative advantages that the innovation
brings? Yes and no. Yes because the inadequacies of an
existing innovation in the face of new or increased demands
lead to calls for an improved innovation or system
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especially where there is clear evidence of the positive
outcomes of an alternative system elsewhere. In the 1980s
and early '90s, computer word-processing programs WordStar
and WordPerfect demonstrated relative advantage over
existing products. And even before the advent of computers
in that era, most offices relied on typewriters, which took
up a lot of space, performed only one function and required
servicing, supplies (type ribbons, whiteout, etc.) and
parts on a regular basis (they were also pretty loud) . As
computers became more prevalent, WordStar and WordPerfect
freed users from typewriters. The relative advantage was
thus obvious.
The word-processing programs did not require
any additional physical space other than the personal
computer, which already performed a number of other office
tasks such as reducing the need for ink and correction
tape; documents could be easily edited prior to printing;
and files could be saved and transported for editing on
other computers using floppy disks. Soon, typewriters were
being phased out of off ices and replaced with these
computer word-processing programs. Therefore, as long as
the problems of an existing innovation persist,
policymakers would make several necessary attempts to get
rid of it even if it is going to take extreme costs and a
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long period of time because, they perceive the alternative
to be worth it in light of its advantages that it is
expected to bring once it has been fully incorporated into
the system.
However, how much cost and how long such
eventual realization of the new system can be born depends
on the adopting environment or policy home. The prolonged
experimentation of the new alternative can come at extreme
opportunity cost that could mean abandoning certain vital
policies in the short run whose consequences can be farreaching into the future. Should an impoverished country
focus all of its resources on a given technology at the
expense of meeting a more immediate need such as the
provision of necessities as rural water and electricity,
food and shelter? In developing countries such as Ghana,
the need for an advanced technology may not be necessary
now in view of its gross illiteracy rate. It is hard to
argue that making desperate attempts to bring the rural
folk into the financial system is more important than
making sure that they assured of three meals per day or
that they are not living on less than a dollar day.
As indicated already, these individuals do not
have the education necessary to comprehend the modus
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operandi of the e-zwich system. Furthermore, most rural
homes do not even have televisions and radio sets to listen
to any commercials about the program due to the fact that
they do not have electricity at their homes. This
unfavorable environment perhaps explains why as of 2012,
estimates suggested that monthly transactions (a more
useful measure) never exceeded 10,000 as compared to the
success of a private consumer smartcard company in postcommunist Hungary, GBC, which having launched in an
environment only "mildly" favorable than Ghana's, managed
to deploy 17,000 POSs and process 8 million transactions
per month during the first phase of their operational
strategy ("IMANI Alert: E-Zwich Becoming A Colossal Waste
of Resources?", 2012).
The success of South Africa's system therefore
appears to have buttressed Rogers' argument that relative
advantage is the most important characteristic of
innovation, if it is argued that by clearly anticipating
the positive outcomes of an alternative innovation,
authorities are more than willing to see its success even
in the face of challenges. On the other hand, the relative
lack of environmental support for Ghana's e-zwich system
seems to undermine Rogers' theory. The relative 'failure'
(to be generous) of the e-zwich system, per its primary aim
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of financial inclusion raises three questions. First, does
the failure of the e-zwich system relative to the success
of the South Africa system imply that the success of the
adoption of biometric payment system depends on the 'type'
of service for which the technology is deployed? Second,
was the primary aim of the e-zwich system wrong in the
first place? And third, should the e-zwich system be run by
a private firm?
For the first question, the answer would be in
the affirmative as judged by the deployment of biometric
payment technology in social welfare schemes of both South
Africa and India. Much has already been discussed about
South Africa's system whereby enrollment has increased to
over nine million. An even more remarkable feat has been
achieved with the biometric payment system (Smartcard
program) in Andrah Prakesh (AP), India. The Government of
Andrah Prakesh (AoAP), which deployed the technology to two
welfare schemes: the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural
Employment Schem (MGNREGS) and the state-sponsored social
security pension (SSP) program, has been able to "overcome
sizeable operational barriers to initiate payments in
approximately 76 % (NREGS) and 82% (SSP) of study district
gram panchayats (GPs) as of March 2012"

(Mukhopadhyay,
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Muralidharan, Niehaus & Sukhtankar, 2013). As was the
situation in South Africa, this "impressive success" would
not have taken place had it not been the role of government
functionaries. Mukhopadhyay et al (2013), note that a "key
enabling factor has been the commitment of top-ranking
government officials to develop, monitor, and improve the
Smartcard program on an on-going basis". And so it is
evident that the compelling nature of the social welfare
schemes in place in both South Africa has contributed to
the success of the payment systems. The extent of the
success with Andrah Pradesh's biometric payment is so
remarkable that "over 90% of beneficiaries report that they
pref er the biometric payment system to the previous system
of having to travel to the post off ice to collect payments"
(Mukhopadhyay et al, 2013).
The second question, the study recommends the
expert advice of IMANI. The reputable think-tank, based on
their analysis suggests that the aim of e-zwich should have
been "branchless banking" instead of "financial inclusion".
It contends that even though authorities assert that 20% of
the population is unbanked, this statistic can be
misleading, in that, the figure does not commensurate with
the more critical indicator: funds outside the banking
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system, which the Bank of Ghana closely monitors. Per their
argument, the currency ratio indices have consistently
shown that the bulk of Ghana's money still passes through
the banks. Therefore, the middle and upper classes control
the country's wealth and they are generally well-banked.
Thus the real challenge of the e-zwich system per this
objective is that, do poor, illiterate, rural dwellers have
cash hoarded up that can be "deposit-mobilized" into the
banking system? IMANI's analysis suggests that this is not
the case.
The answer to the issue of whether the e-zwich
system should be privatized or not can also be found in the
successful implementation of the social welfare schemes in
both South Africa and India. Although the state apparatus
has been crucial in the success of the biometric payments
systems in both countries, the role of the private-sector
cannot be downplayed. As indicated earlier, South Africa's
system is managed by Net l's Cash Payment System and most
of the company's national switch and smartcard
implementations in other African countries had been on
joint venture basis with the government, and card issuance
per capita appears to have been more successful in many of
these places ("IMANI Alert: E-Zwich Becoming A Colossal
Waste of Resources?", 2012). The same situation prevails in
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NET l's Latin American operations too. In India, The AP
Smartcard program has been implemented through a bank-led,
business correspondent (BC) approach, within the structure
of "one-district-one-bank" model (however, in three
districts, the Post Office has been contracted by the GoAP
to issue biometric payments) . The payment delivery system
relies upon customer service providers (CSPs) to transact
last-mile payments at the behest of contracted banks, using
POS devices for authentication. The success of the systems
in place in the above countries therefore questions the
decision taken by the Bank of Ghana to be the sole owner
and sole carrier of risks in Ghana's case.
To reinstate, the Andrah Prakesh case shows
governmental actors' role in the successful delivery of
biometric technology. And so Muller (2010), states that the
potential adoption of biometric ID cards tend to boost
"dominant contemporary discourse and logics of rule and
governance and generally focus on issues associated with
the implementation of biometric ID cards". Therefore he
explains that in Canada, the Office of the Privacy
Commissioner of Ontario and Citizenship and Immigration
Canada (CIC) are regularly involved in the evaluation of
biometric technologies, biometric encryption and the
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relationship between security and privacy and the role that
biometrics can influence that relationship. Furthermore,
after adoption of the biometric technology, the lack of any
trade organization-based regulatory mechanism may
ultimately result in more "draconian" governmental
restrictions if consumer harm is enough (Langenderfer &
Linnhoff, 2005). If governments are influential in the
adoption of biometric technologies then it reasons that
government workers' attitude to these new technology is key
to ensuring successful adoption.
Thus it can be investigated whether workers at
GhIPSS have had a lukewarm attitude towards the e-zwich
system which may be contributing to the relative
ineffectiveness of the system. An exploratory study of
government employees' perceptions of the introduction of
biometrics at the workplace in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
indicated that a significant digital and cultural gap
between the technological awareness of employees and the
preferred authentication solutions promoted by management
(Alhussain, & Drew, 2009). A lack of trust in technology,
its potential for misuse and public management motives
reflect public managers' need to consider their
responsibilities for narrowing these gaps. In view of this
it is evident that overcoming public workers' resistance,
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especially those who have a direct impact, is an essential
issue facing biometric implementation. And so in Andrah
Pradesh, Mukhopadhyay et al, 2013 underscores the critical
role of government employees in the state's implementation
of the biometric payment system:
In general, the high degree of engagement
maintained by top government officials has had the
following important implications: 1) it has signalled to
major stake-holders that GoAP considers the Smartcard
program to be a priority, 2) it has allowed GoAP to develop
relationships with the main agents of implementation, the
banks and TSPs, and 3) it has helped to establish a regular
discourse on how to resolve programmatic and operational
challenges.
Therefore where government actors lack the
right attitude to ensure the implementation of biometric
technologies it is perhaps necessary to establish and
enforce a legal framework to support it. However, in the
developing countries including Ghana and South Africa, the
adoption of new technologies is rarely preceded by the
adoption and implementation of robust regulatory
frameworksl.

In Ghana, the government's role in the

implementation of the e-zwich at the early stages was the
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coercion of private banks to adopt the system through
directives by the Central Bank of Ghana, but these
directives had no legal basis. That is, no law was
specifically created to help back the implementation of the
system, except those existing laws that gave the Central
Bank the power to initiate policies based on its
discretion.
However, the Ghana Interbank Payment and
Settlement Systems Limited (GhIPSS) , a wholly owned
subsidiary of the Bank of Ghana, was incorporated in May
2007 (a year before the launch of e-zwich) with a mandate
to implement and manage interoperable payment system
infrastructures for banks and non-bank financial
institutions in Ghana. In a more proactive role, the
government has recently stepped up its effort to enroll
public sectors workers in the system. The Controller and
Accountant- General Department is expected to commence the
payment of all civil servants by a biometric E-zwich
platform in 2015. This follows an on-going pilot program to
gradually ensure public sector workers are paid via the Ezwich payment system2. The roll out plan was initially to
start with the finance department of the Controller and
Accountant Department, then to all staff members in Accra.
This follows the payment of all National Service personnel
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on their e-zwich cards, which began much earlier in
December last year. The department therefore hopes to learn
the experiences of the latter to inform how to proceed with
its objective.
Also, the government, in financing the Ghana
School Feeding Program, has started paying caterers through
e-zwich. President Mahama made the promise in 2014 and a
little less than a year after that promise, the school
feeding caterers are being paid electronically using the ezwich biometric smart card as well as mobile money
platforms ("Paying School Feeding Caterers On E-Zwich
Begins", 2015). The government also secures loan for the
improvement of the system. In 2011, despite the opposition
from the Minority caucus, parliament approved 70 million
Euro loan facility that is meant to finance the e-zwich
rural branchless banking ("Parliament Approves 70 Million
Euros For E-Zwich Project", 2011).

This is where the role

of the Ghana government stops; it seeks to encourage
patronage of the system by enrolling more public workers
onto the scheme as well as seeking funds for the
improvement of the system. Thus the GhIPSS by being a
subsidiary of the Bank of Ghana which is solely owned by
the state, receives substantial support from the government
and its initiatives are therefore expected to be in line
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with those of the government or at least, needs
governmental approval before implementation.
In South Africa while the distribution of the
grants is solely the responsibility of the private firm
Cash Payment Services (CPS), the social grant system is
wholly administered by the South African Social Security
Agency (SASSA) . Even though the leadership team includes
some cabinet ministers (Minister and Deputy Minister of
Social Development), its standing as an independent agency
rather than a government department means it has a number
of discretionary powers. This gives it greater flexibility
in addressing the problem of acute skill shortages that so
bedevils government departments. That is, government's role
in the country's biometric payment is relatively minimal,
but this does not prevent it from intervening in the scheme
when it deems necessary. Even before the KwaZulu biometric
payment was transformed into a national social grant
scheme, there was some interference from members of the
national government. For instance, in response to grantholders in Eastern Cape having died while waiting for
payment and other complaints by beneficiaries of having to
wait for hours for CPS trucks to arrive, Minister of
Welfare, Zola Skweyiya, denounced the CPS contract. He
accused the company of 'gross and flagrant violations' of
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the terms of the contract and the 'human and constitutional
rights of our people', he called for an end to the contract
(Breckinridge, 2005). Recently, the company has faced
significant criticisms especially with the Black Sash and
its partners collecting documentation from thousands of
grant recipients about deductions being made without their
permission against their accounts ("Netl - The Company That
Runs The Social Grant Payment System"). In consequence to
these complaints, the Minister of Social Development,
Bathabile Dlamini, set up a task team to examine the issue
and in September last year announced, among other things:
that Sassa and her department would ensure that CPS
complied with all relevant legislation; -that payment systems would be
designed in such a manner that social grant beneficiaries' bank
accounts are off limits to creditors; and -that all debit deductions
for Umoya Manje services (a Netl subsidiary that facilitates purchasing
of cellphone time on credit), loans and any other financial service
providers other than legal deductions would be reversed.

Thus while both SASSA and CPS have a high
degree of independence to execute its mandates, the
interest of the public is paramount, hence, the government
will step in to ensure that any problems associated with
the biometric payment system are resolved. Besides, as long
as SASSA remains a state institution, government
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interference in its operations are inevitable even if it
means the government overstepping its boundaries especially
when it is funding the operations of the system. Thus
although it may seem the government is breaching the law by
interfering, it can be seen as 'moral' not only to SASSA,
but also to the many beneficiaries of the scheme.
Just as government and its officials are
important in the successful delivery of biometric payment
systems, it is equally important for relevant stakeholders
in the private sector to show commitment to the innovation.
The financial institutions in Ghana did not demonstrate
gross resentment towards the e-zwich system (at least in
the public eye), however, their support was lukewarm. This
is because of the overall "policed monopoly" of the Central
Bank in the implementation of the system, even though there
was some level of collaboration with the banks. Commercial
banks were more interested in serving their customers who
demanded international debit cards such as VISA and
MasterCard at the expense of the e-zwich cards. Even though
they were generally interested in the new system, their
actions showed otherwise and this adversely affected wide
scale enrollment of customers onto the scheme. In short, it
is not enough for an innovation to exhibit Rogers' relative
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advantages, more has to be done to bring relevant actors in
the implementation of the innovation.
Therefore, is there any indication that Ghana's
e-zwich is bound to start realizing significant benefits
anytime soon? It is justified to believe that without
urgent reform, e-zwich would end up as a colossal white
elephant. This does not have to be the case, since as per
the analysis above, e-zwich can become a productive
national asset if managed well. Like human beings, policies
are not an 'island'; they need the right incentives and
support systems to become and remain successful.
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